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Valuation Uncertainty, Market Sentiment and the 
Informativeness of Institutional Trades 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior studies indicate that institutional investors are informed, in the sense that their trades predict 
price changes.  In this study we show that return predictive ability of institutions arises (after 
controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum) mainly from institutional sales of hard-to-
value stocks during periods of positive market sentiment.  These results support the notion that 
these stocks tend to be overvalued during periods of bullish market sentiment, and institutions 
contribute to market efficiency by identifying and trading on these overpriced stocks.   
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“Security analysis would be used not to discover undervalued securities about to undergo a rapid 
price increase (an activity which competition should prevent from yielding appreciable returns 
over cost), but to avoid purchasing (or to sell if already owned) the occasional overvalued security 
which less informed investors have bid up”.  
 ---- Miller (1977) 
 
In the span of five decades, institutional ownership in the US equity market has increased 
from 8 to more than 68 percent, and institutional trades account for more than 96 percent of NYSE 
trading volume in the recent data.1 This has resulted in increased research focusing on the role of 
institutions in facilitating market liquidity and affecting price formation.   
There have been numerous studies providing evidence that institutions are informed. For 
example, Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007) find that the stocks purchased by mutual funds earn 
significantly higher returns than the stocks they sell. Yan and Zhang (2009) report that the trades 
of institutional investors with short investment horizons exhibit higher levels of return predictive 
ability. Several studies, including in particular Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) and 
Boehmer and Kelley (2009) present evidence that increased institutional trading has improved 
market efficiency. Consistent with the reasoning that enhanced competition among institutions has 
reduced mispricing, Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010) show that the superior predictive ability 
of institutional trades for future price changes has declined since the 1990s.   
In this paper, we assess whether institutional trades continue to display predictive ability, 
and, if so, whether the predictive ability varies with stock characteristics and across market states. 
We focus in particular on institutional sales during periods of positive market sentiment. This is 
                                                          
1 According to the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds (2009) report and Boehmer and Kelley (2009). 
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because, as Miller (1977) has noted, uninformed investors may occasionally bid up share prices 
beyond fundamental value, and the overvaluation is most likely to occur for stocks with high 
valuation uncertainty (VU).  Such overvaluation would present profit opportunities. Moreover, as 
Pontiff (2006) emphasizes, firm specific risk creates costs that impede arbitrage.2  Such risk will 
be particularly pronounced for those securities with high VU, especially during periods when 
market sentiments are overly optimistic. We therefore assess separately the predictive ability of 
institutional purchases versus sales of stocks with different levels of VU. In addition, we also 
distinguish whether the trades are completed during periods of high versus low market sentiment.  
Our analysis is also related to the existing literature on valuation uncertainty and market 
sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) show that the prices of high VU stocks are bid up during 
periods of optimistic market sentiment, resulting in lower future stock returns. Stambaugh, Yu, 
and Yuan (2012) combine market sentiment with Miller (1977)’s short sale argument and show 
that the return on the short leg of several long-short strategies is lower during high sentiment 
periods.  
In light of these findings, we hypothesize that well-informed institutional investors should 
be able to profit from selling high VU stocks during periods of high investor sentiment. In other 
words, we assess whether institutional traders take advantage of the aforementioned overvaluation.  
To test this hypothesis, we obtain institutional trading data from the CDA/Spectrum 
quarterly institutional holdings database (13F). The 13F dataset contains the universe of all large 
institutions with greater than $100 million of securities under management.3 We consider eight 
                                                          
2 Several studies find evidence that firm specific idiosyncratic volatility makes it risky for risk-averse arbitrageur to 
take positions. For example, Mendenhall (2004) finds that magnitude of post-earnings-announcement drift is strongly 
positively related to the idiosyncratic risk. Mashruwala, Rajgopal, Shevlin (2006) find accrual anomaly is concentrated 
in firms with high idiosyncratic stock return volatility.  
3 Using quarterly institutional holding data from 13F may underestimate institutional investors’ stock selection skills 
and therefore will bias against the tests of our hypothesis. 
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VU proxies used in the related literature: firm age (inverse), stock return volatility, idiosyncratic 
risk, turnover, cash flow volatility, firm size, book-to-market (inverse), and analyst forecast 
dispersion (Baker and Wurgler (2006), Zhang (2006), and Kumar (2009)). We also derive the first 
principal component (FCP) of all the eight VU proxies as a combined VU measure. We categorize 
a trading portfolio formation quarter as a positive or negative sentiment quarter based on the 
composite investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). We then track the 
performance of the stocks that institutions intensively buy or sell during each quarter, and report 
subsequent stock returns adjusted by the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW 1997) 
characteristics. We report abnormal returns for stocks sorted by the levels of VU, and during high 
versus low sentiment periods, respectively. 4  
 Largely consistent with our main hypothesis, our results indicate that the predictive ability 
of institutional trades is mainly found in stocks with high VU and more so during periods of 
positive market-wide investor sentiment. Specifically, high VU stocks that institutions intensively 
sell significantly underperform stocks with similar firm sizes, book-to-market values, and past 
returns. In contrast, there are no consistently significant positive abnormal returns following 
institutional buys. We further find that the predictive ability is usually confined to institutional 
sales of high VU stocks during periods of high market sentiment. In contrast, there is little 
consistent predictive ability in institutional sales of high VU stock during low sentiment periods. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that market sentiment is the key driver of the 
overvaluation of high VU stocks. Interestingly, institutional sales in the high VU stocks during 
high sentiment periods predict significantly negative subsequent quarter’s earnings surprise. We 
do not observe this for sales of low VU stocks or for sales completed during low sentiment periods. 
                                                          
4 For the sake of brevity, we report results for firm age (inverse), stock return volatility, analyst forecast dispersion 
and the first principal component in the main tables and the rest of the results are available in the online appendix. 
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These results indicate that it is possible that institutions’ informational advantage may be due to 
their ability to forecast earnings-related fundamentals. 
In light of the evidence reported by Barras et al. (2010) that institutional trading 
performance declines since the mid-1990s, we partition our sample into pre-1996 and post-1996 
periods to examine whether our main findings remain robust post mid-1990s. We find equally 
strong predictive power of institutional trades for both subsamples. In the post-1996 sample, we 
find that institutional selling in high VU stocks during optimistic market sentiment periods 
continues to predict statistically significant negative future returns. 
This paper extends and refines the literature on the informational content of institutional 
trades.  Our paper is the first to show evidence that institutional trades’ significant predictive power 
is largely confined to sell trades. This evidence is consistent with the reasoning of Miller (1977) 
that potentially successful security analysis should be derived from selling or avoiding buying 
overvalued stocks, especially for stocks with high VU. Further, by documenting that the predictive 
ability of institutions usually comes from the trading of high VU stocks during periods of 
optimistic market sentiment, our results support and extends the findings of Baker and Wurgler 
(2006). 5 
In our opinion, this study is most closely related to Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012), who 
argue that impediments to short selling are the major obstacle to eliminating overpricing in the 
presence of market-wide sentiment. They examine a broad set of well-documented anomalies 
relative to the Fama and French three-factor model. And they document that adjusted profits from 
a long-short strategy are confined to months following high investor sentiment periods, and that 
the profit from exploiting the anomalies are attributable to the short-leg portfolio. A key difference 
                                                          
5 Our finding is also consistent with Yan and Zhang (2009), and Schultz (2010), who suggest that profitable trading 
opportunities are more likely to arise for small and growth (which are highly uncertain) stocks in general.  
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between our study and theirs is that we focus on institutional trades. Specifically, we focus on 
assessing whether institutional investors are able to exploit and correct the overpricing. To the 
extent that institutional investors are dominant players in today’s stock market, our results on the 
informativeness of institutional investors’ trades will also shed light on the stock market efficiency. 
In this regard, our paper compliments that of Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 develops the hypothesis; 
section 2 describes the data and variables constructed. In section 3 we present our empirical 
findings, and section 4, robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Existing research findings on the informativeness of institutional trades are mixed. 
Proponents of efficient markets argue that given the fierce competitiveness of institutions in the 
equity market, any mispricing will be arbitraged away instantaneously. Studies supporting this 
notion include Gompers and Metrick (2001), Barras et al. (2010), and Lewellen (2011).  
However, there are numerous studies that find evidence suggesting that market may not be 
efficient, as there are occasionally mispriced stocks in the market. One particular explanation for 
mispricing is by Miller (1977), who proposes that if pessimists face binding short-sales constraints, 
then the price of an asset will reflect the valuation of optimists and as a result, he predicts that 
stocks with higher uncertainty will tend to be overpriced. Empirical evidence supporting Miller’s 
(1977) assertions include Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), 
and Zhang (2006). These studies documented empirical evidence suggesting that young, volatile, 
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stocks with higher analyst dispersion, and other “valuation uncertain” (VU) stocks are subjected 
to overvaluation.6  
In the next two sections, we will review the literature on the effect of VU and market 
sentiment on stock returns. We will then use implications from these two strands of research to 
develop our main hypothesis. 
 
1.1 Valuation Uncertainty (VU) and Stock Returns 
The concept of VU originates from Miller (1977), who argues that when uncertainty is 
high, disagreement among investors regarding stock value will widen. Combining this uncertainty 
with binding short-sale constraints will keep pessimistic opinions from being reflected in price, 
and prevent informed traders from arbitraging it away instantaneously. Hence, the combination of 
uncertainty and binding short-sale constraints may lead to overpricing.  
It is further argued that overpricing, or mispricing in general, is a result of an uninformed 
demand shock caused by sentiment investors and the informed arbitrage against these investors 
can be costly and risky.7  Sentiment investors are presumed to be “overconfident” as they tend to 
overweight their private information and underweight public information when updating beliefs 
about stock values. 8 If the market contains both sentiment and informed investors, then one can 
expect divergence of opinions about security value. Under greater uncertainty, the disagreement is 
more pronounced because investors’ private valuations are more diffused and feedback on the 
                                                          
6 Valuation uncertainty refers to information sparsity or ambiguity. The concept of valuation uncertainty dates to the 
revolutionary work by Knight (1921). Uncertainty is distinguished from risk in that risk reflects randomness with 
known probability while uncertainty is randomness with unknown probabilities.  
7 For detailed discussion, see De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Barberis and Thaler (2003, P. 1056), and Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
8 The “overconfidence” bias is argued in Odean (1998) to explain excess trading activities, in Hong and Stein (2003) 
and Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) to explain investors’ disagreement and excess trading volume, in Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) to theorize market underreaction and overreaction. 
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quality of their private signal is more difficult to obtain (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998, 2001), Hirshleifer (2001), and Kumar (2009)). Further, such highly uncertain stocks also 
tend to be difficult to arbitrage, due to elevated information risk and cost associated with trading 
against mispricing (Baker and Wurgler (2006), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Pontiff (2006)). 
Consequently, highly uncertain stocks will earn lower subsequent returns as the uncertainty is 
resolved and negative valuations are eventually priced (Chen, Hong and Stein (2002)). 9 
 
1.2 Market Sentiment and Stock Returns 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) add another dimension to this hypothesis by proposing that 
market sentiment plays an important role.10  They find that the overpricing of highly uncertain 
stocks is particularly prominent during episodes of high market sentiment. Specifically, when 
beginning period of sentiment is high, highly uncertain stocks will earn significantly lower 
subsequent returns. Baker and Wurgler’s reasoning is as follows. Since mispricing is the result of 
both a demand shock by uninformed investors and limits of arbitrage, uninformed investors exhibit 
increased systematic optimism and speculative demand during periods of optimistic sentiment. 
Further, with binding short-sales constraint, informed arbitrage against these investors become 
riskier and more costly. Indeed, they document that highly uncertain stocks traded during periods 
when investors are optimistic earn lower subsequent returns. In a recent study, Stambaugh, Yu, 
and Yuan (2012) examine a broad set of well documented anomalies relative to the Fama and 
French three-factor model and find results that are consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
                                                          
9  Extant empirical studies have largely confirmed Miller’s (1977) hypothesis by documenting negative relationship 
between binding short sale constraints, divergence of opinion, and subsequent stock returns, such as  Desai, Ramesh, 
Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002), Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), Boehme, 
Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006), Zhang (2006), and Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005).  
10 Sentiment, broadly defined, refers to whether an individual feels excessively optimistic or pessimistic about a 
situation: a bullish (bearish) investor overestimates (underestimates) asset value (Baker and Wurgler (2006) and 
Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2010)). 
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1.3 Hypothesis Development - Market Sentiment and Institutional Trades 
Empirical evidence reported by Zhang (2006) and Barker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that 
highly uncertain stocks are subject to overvaluation during periods of high market sentiment. Their 
findings have both cross sectional and inter-temporal implications for informed trading strategies 
by institutional investors. As Miller (1977) pointed out, any profit from skilled analysis should be 
derived from selling the overvalued securities with high VU. This is due to the fact that less 
informed investors have bid the prices significantly higher than their fundamental values. 
Given these findings, we hypothesize that any distinctive informational advantages of 
institutional investors, either due to their access to more precise information or to their expertise 
in interpreting public information, will be manifested in their ability to identify and sell overvalued 
stocks, especially during high sentiment periods. As such, high VU stocks that institutions 
intensively sell during periods of high market optimism are expected to earn significantly negative 
subsequent returns.11  
 
2. Data, Methodology, and Variables Construction 
Our sample consists of common stocks (share code equals 10 or 11) listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ (exchange code equals 1, 2, or 3). We form the institutional trading 
portfolios during the period from the second quarter of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 2010.  We are 
restricted to the 1981 through 2010 sample period due to the availability of the market sentiment 
index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). We then track the subsequent returns till the fourth 
quarter of 2013. We also obtain analyst forecast data to construct one of our valuation uncertainty 
                                                          
11 We do not expect institutional buys in highly uncertain stocks will be associated with significant positive abnormal 
returns. If there is any mispricing or undervaluation, it will be arbitraged away instantaneously due to fierce 
competition among these informed investors. 
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proxies from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), spanning the period from year 1984 
to 2010. 
We obtain quarterly institutional holdings for all common stocks from the CDA/Spectrum 
Institutional (13F) database.12 We obtain monthly stock returns from the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) monthly tapes, and daily returns and trading volume from daily tapes, 
respectively. We require at least 12 months of data since the first appearance of a stock’s return in 
CRSP to exclude firms in the stage of initial IPO. In line with previous studies, stocks with a price 
less than $5 are excluded from the sample (Zhang (2006)). After implementing the deletion criteria, 
the remaining sample has a minimum of 2,397 firms and a maximum of 5,036 firms with an 
average of 3,606 firms per quarter in our sample. 
We obtain book value of equity and quarterly earnings announcement data from Compustat. 
The Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) benchmark returns and portfolio 
assignments are obtained from Professor Wermers’ data library. 13  DGTW abnormal returns 
control for firms’ size, book-to-market, and past performance. We use the index of market 
sentiment developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) to derive our quarterly sentiment measure.14  
 
2.1 Institutional Trading Portfolios 
We follow the Nofsinger and Sias’s (1999) methodology to construct ownership-stratified 
institutional trading portfolios. This approach enables the calculation of changes in institutional 
ownership while controlling for initial ownership at the beginning of each quarter. Specifically, at 
                                                          
12 All investment managers with discretion over securities worth $100 million or more are required to report all equity 
positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 to the SEC at the end of each quarter. 
13 We wish to  thank Professor Russ Wermers for making the data available at 
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm   
14 We wish to thank Professors Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey Wurgler for making the index available to researchers at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/ 
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the beginning of each quarter, all firms are first sorted into 5 quintiles based on institutional 
ownership, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of shares held by total institutional investors at 
the end of prior quarter to the total number of shares outstanding. Firms within each initial 
institutional-ownership-sorted portfolio are then further sorted into 5 quintiles based on the change 
in institutional ownership over the quarter, resulting in 25 portfolios.  
    Firms in the quintile of stocks experiencing the largest increase (decrease) in institutional 
ownership within each initial ownership quintile are then re-aggregated across the initial 
ownership-sorted quintiles to form an Intense Buy (Intense Sell) portfolio. Our sample period starts 
from the first quarter of 1981 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2010. Since institutional trading is 
calculated as the change in institutional ownership from the prior quarter to the current quarter, the 
first eligible observation for trading is from the second quarter of 1981. We examine the 
subsequent returns for the 3-month, 6-month, 1-year and 3-year holding period. As a result, even 
though our portfolio formation period ends in the fourth quarter of 2010, our evaluation of the 
holding period returns ends in the fourth quarter of 2013.  
  
2.2 Proxies for Valuation Uncertainty (VU) 
Past empirical research papers on VU include studies by Zhang (2006), Jiang et al. (2005) 
and Kumar (2009). Collectively, these papers have discussed comprehensively the rationale behind 
the adoption of various VU proxies. We adopt eight commonly used proxies for VU in the analysis. 
These eight proxies are:   
1) 1/Firm Age. Firms with a long history tend to have more information available to the 
market (Barry and Brown (1985) and Zhang (2006), and Jiang et al. (2005)). Therefore, 
younger firms’ valuation tends to be highly uncertain as compared to older ones. Firm 
12 
 
age is measured as the number of months since the first appearance of a stock’s return 
in CRSP. We take the inverse of the firm age in our empirical analysis, so that a higher 
value represents higher uncertainty. 
2) Return Volatility. Zhang (2006) and Jiang et al. (2005) argue that stock volatility 
captures information signal variation of a firm’s fundamental value. Hence, it is 
reasonable to use return volatility as a viable VU measure. We follow Zhang (2006) 
and calculate return volatility as the standard deviation of weekly returns over the year, 
ending at the beginning of portfolio formation quarter.  
3) Analyst Dispersion. Dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts is a widely used proxy for 
the uncertainty regarding future earnings. Analyst dispersion captures the degree of 
consensus among analysts and market participants (e.g., Barron et al. (1998), Barron 
and Stuerke (1998), Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Imhoff and Lobo (1992), 
Lang and Lundholm (1996), and Zhang (2006))). Similar to these studies, we adopt 
analyst forecast dispersion, which is the standard deviation of the individual analyst 
forecasts of the firm’s quarterly earnings prior to the portfolio formation. However, 
using analyst dispersion comes with a cost as it will restrict our sample to firms with 
analyst coverage which tends to be larger firms.  
4) Idiosyncratic Risk. Stocks with high idiosyncratic risk have been argued to have higher 
levels of VU and hence, harder to value (Baker and Wurgler (2006), Kumar (2009), 
and Hirshleifer (2001)). Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the average monthly 
idiosyncratic volatility during the prior quarter before portfolio formation. Following 
Fu (2009) and Chua, Goh and Zhang (2010), we define monthly idiosyncratic volatility 
as the product of (a) the standard deviation of the regression residuals of excess daily 
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returns on the daily Fama-French three factors (FF3), and (b) the square root of the 
number of observations in the month.  
5) Stock Turnover. As postulated by Hong and Stein (2006), greater disagreement among 
investors may spur larger trading volume. Hence, a higher level of stock turnover may 
reflect a wider dispersion of opinion among investors, which is more prominent in 
stocks with high VU (Jiang et al. (2005)). Stock Turnover is calculated as the quarterly 
average of the daily turnover of the stock prior to the portfolio formation quarter. To 
address the issue of inflated trading volumes on NASDAQ, we use the exchange-
adjusted turnover in our calculation, which is defined as a stock’s turnover minus the 
average turnover of all stocks listed on the same exchange (either NYSE/AMEX or 
NASDAQ). 
6) Cash flow Volatility. Zhang (2006) argues that cash flow measure is indirectly 
calculated from financial statements and it is more likely to capture the underlying 
volatility. Therefore, following Zhang (2006), we measure cash flow volatility as the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the past 5 years (with a minimum 
of 3 years). Cash flow from operations is earnings before extraordinary items minus 
total accruals, scaled by average total assets, where total accruals are equal to changes 
in current assets minus changes in cash, changes in current liabilities and depreciation 
expense plus changes in short-term debt.  
7) 1/Market capitalization (1/Size). We consider size as an alternative proxy for 
uncertainty, as larger firms tend to have lower valuation uncertainty. We divide the 
sample into three groups corresponding to the tertiles of the outstanding equity value 
at the end of the prior quarter for all NYSE stocks. Zhang (2006) noted that though firm 
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size can be a useful measure of VU, it is likely to capture other confounding effects 
which could potentially bias any inferences about VU. 
8) 1/Book-to-market. Book-to-market ratio is highly likely to reflect VU as firms with 
lower book-to-market tend to be growth firms, which are, in general, harder to value. 
Book-to-market is calculated as book value for the fiscal year, divided by market 
capitalization during that fiscal year. However, similar to market capitalization (Size), 
book-to-market is likely to capture other confounding effects which could potentially 
bias any inferences about VU. For example, some firms with high book-to-market are 
in financially distress and these firms are most likely associated with higher VU. 
In addition to the eight VU proxies, we also use a combined VU measure based on the first 
principal component (FPC) of all eight VU proxies. Each quarter, we perform FPC for all of the 
eight VU variables to extract the common variation among the variables. Specifically, we derive 
the FPC of 1/firm age, return volatility, turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, cash flow volatility, 
1/size, 1/book-to-market, and analyst dispersion and use FPC as a new proxy for VU.15  
For the sake of brevity and readability, we report in the main article the results for the first 
three VU proxies: 1/Firm Age, Volatility, and Analyst Dispersion, and the FPC of the eight VU 
proxies.  We report results for the other VU proxies in the online appendix. 
 
2.3 Market Sentiment Measure 
We rely on the monthly composite index of market sentiment developed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) as our sentiment measure. The index is based on the first principal component of 
                                                          
15 We also considered using analyst coverage as a proxy but given that the correlation between analyst coverage and 
firm size is very high (Pearson correlation is 0.39 and Spearman correlation is 0.71), we decided not to report results 
on analyst coverage. 
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six variables associated with market sentiment level. The six variables are share turnover, IPO 
volume, IPO first-day returns, equity share in new issues, the closed-end fund discount, and the 
dividend premium. Variables positively associated with sentiment levels include share turnover, 
IPO volume, IPO first-day returns, and the equity share in new issues, and those negatively 
associated are the closed-end fund discount and the dividend premium.  
Since our trading portfolios are formed at the end of each quarter, we average the monthly 
sentiment index during the portfolio formation quarter and treat it as our measure of market 
sentiment. We then dichotomize the sample period as positive versus negative sentiment periods 
(quarters). Depiction for our quarterly average of the monthly Baker-Wurgler sentiment index is 
presented in Figure 1. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.4 Summary Statistics  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our sample. Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
for VU variables and major firm characteristics. The average market capitalization is $1.82 billion 
and the book-to-market is 0.66, which are comparable to previous studies on valuation uncertainty 
(Zhang (2006)). All VU proxies have sufficient cross-sectional variation. The firm age ranges from 
12 months (our minimum requirement) to 1,019 months (85 years), with an average age of 211 
months and a median of 154 months. The average return volatility is 10.l5% and institutional 
ownership is 40.15%. The institutional ownership is higher than those reported in earlier studies, 
which could be due to the fact that institutional ownership increases dramatically over time. The 
idiosyncratic volatility is slightly lower than previous studies (Fu (2009)). This is to be expected 
as the firms in this study are relatively larger, as in Zhang (2006). 
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 [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel B presents the correlation matrix for VU variables (Pearson correlations are shown 
above the diagonal with the Spearman correlations below). As expected, VU measures are largely 
positively correlated. Volatility, idiosyncratic risk, turnover, analyst dispersion, and cash flow 
volatility are positively correlated and they are negatively correlated with firm age, size and book-
to-market. The correlations among VU variables are moderate, which suggests that each of these 
variables may capture some different aspects of valuation uncertainty. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient on institutional ownership is positively correlated with firm age, size and turnover but 
negatively correlated to idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that institutions tend to hold stocks with a 
longer history, larger in size, and higher liquidity, and that they avoid holding stocks with greater 
firm specific risks.  
Panel C presents the average institutional ownership and the average number of stocks held 
by institutions for the VU-based tertile sorts. Notably, institutional ownership is higher for lower 
VU stocks, for example, firms with longer history, firms with lower idiosyncratic risk and lower 
cash flow volatility. However, we observe larger institutional ownership for higher VU stocks 
using proxies such as turnover and 1/book-to-market. 
 
3. Empirical Results  
3.1 Overall Return Predictive Ability of Institutions 
We begin by presenting the general return predictive ability of institutions. Table 2 reports 
the buy-and-hold returns on institutional trading portfolios in the first three, six, and twelve months 
after portfolio formation. We report the raw returns as well as the DGTW-adjusted returns on the 
portfolios of stocks with intense institutional buying (Intense Buy) and intense institutional selling 
17 
 
(Intense Sell). We also report the difference in returns between the Intense Buy and Intense Sell 
portfolios (Intense Buy-Sell). 
The DGTW-adjusted returns allow us to control for the size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effect, and by doing so, allows for inferences on the abnormal trading performance of 
institutions. We compute the returns on each portfolio over a given horizon as the time-series 
average of the cross sectional mean returns. The reported t-statistics are based on Newey–West 
(1987) standard errors to account for serial correlation.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Results from Table 2 suggest that there is only weak evidence of predictive ability of 
institutional trading in general, which is consistent with prior studies that used the same 
institutional data (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Yan and Zhang (2009)). The raw portfolio return 
between the Intense Buy and Intense Sell portfolios are 0.43%, 0.93%, and 1.01% for the three-, 
six-, and twelve-month holding periods, respectively and statistically significant for the three- and 
six-month holding periods. The magnitude of the portfolio returns are reduced after controlling for 
the DGTW benchmark. However, statistical inference for DGTW-adjusted return for the same 
portfolio is insignificant for three- and twelve-month holding periods.  
A closer inspection of the DGTW-adjusted returns on the Intense Buy and Sell portfolios 
reveals an interesting pattern. It appears that the abnormal return predictive ability of institutions 
is mainly concentrated on the sell side. The DGTW-adjusted returns on the Intense Sell portfolio 
are statistically significant at the 1% level 6 months and one year after the portfolio formation 
quarter. In contrast, the Intense Buy portfolio exhibits no evidence of significant positive abnormal 
returns. For the sake of brevity, we report only DGTW-adjusted returns hereafter. 
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3.2 Predictive Ability of Institutional Trades Across Different Levels of VU  
Next, we investigate how VU contributes to institutional return predictability. We construct 
initial ownership-stratified institutional trading portfolios following the method described in 
Section 2, and then independently sort the sample of stocks into tertiles based on the level of VU 
measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio formation (using different proxies). The 
intersections from the two independent rankings result in 15 institutional trading-VU portfolios.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 reports the three-, six-, and twelve-month DGTW-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
of the Intense Buy and Intense Sell portfolios and their differences. It is interesting to note that the 
differences between the two portfolios are positive and statistically significant in the High-VU 
category for most of our VU proxies. As exemplified by the 1/Firm Age proxy, the three month 
DGTW–adjusted return difference between the Intense Buy and Intense Sell portfolios among 
high-VU stocks is 0.68% and statistically significant and remains significant till six months after. 
In contrast, the return differences between the Intense Buy and Intense Sell portfolios among Low-
VU stocks are statistically insignificant or even negative.  
More importantly, the return predictive ability of institutions for high VU stocks is mainly 
restricted to institutional Intense Sell portfolios. Specifically, the Intense Sell portfolio of high VU 
stocks significantly underperforms their DGTW matched firms for all holding periods. 
Exemplified by the 1/Firm age proxy, the DGTW–adjusted return is –0.89% for three months 
holding period, and the underperformance cumulates to –3.00% after one year and remains 
statistically significant. In contrast, there is no consistent evidence of positive abnormal returns on 
the Intense Buy portfolios of high VU stocks. Nor is there any evidence suggesting superior stock 
selection skill by institutions for Mid VU or low VU stocks. Hence, our findings are consistent 
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with our hypothesis that the main source of institutional return predictability comes from the 
selling of highly uncertain stocks that tend to become overpriced, as Miller (1977) suggests. 
 
3.3 Future Return Predictability in Each Subsequent Quarter and Long-term Evidence 
 In this section, we examine the quarterly returns after the portfolio formation date. In the 
previous section, we have shown the return predictability of institutional trades stems from selling 
in high VU stocks by using the buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). However, BHARs may result in 
false inferences of the price adjustments to events as the BHARs can grow with the holding period 
even though there is no evidence of abnormal returns after the first period (Fama (1998)). To 
address this concern, we follow Wermers (1999) by reporting the quarterly buy–and–hold returns 
over the four quarters after portfolio formation separately. By doing so, it allows the examination 
of the institutional return predictive ability in each quarter following the portfolio formation. In 
addition, it allows us to investigate the subsequent long term returns to examine whether there is 
evidence of return reversals.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 breaks down the buy-and-hold DGTW-adjusted returns reported in Table 3 for the 
top VU tertile stocks into subsequent quarterly returns. Not surprisingly, the quarterly return 
difference between the Intense Buy and Intense Sell portfolios for the high VU stocks decreases 
as the holding period extends. But the negative abnormal returns remain significant beyond two 
quarters for stocks in the Intense Sell portfolios. For example, when using 1/Firm age as proxy, 
high VU stocks that institutions intensively sell underperforms the DGTW benchmark by 0.88% 
for the first quarter and continues to underperform for the second and third quarter. Even during 
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the fourth quarter after the portfolio formation date, the high VU stocks underperform the DGTW 
benchmark by 0.57% and statistically significant.   
Importantly, we also find no evidence of return reversals for the negative returns on the 
Intense Sell portfolios in the long run (QTR+5 through QTR+12), which suggests that stock price 
adjustments following institutional selling is permanent. 
 
3.4 Market Sentiment and Institutional Return Predictability  
To further test whether institutional investors are able to exploit the overpricing of high 
VU stocks especially during periods of high market sentiment, we examine their predictive ability 
during optimistic versus pessimistic sentiment periods, respectively. Table 5 Panels A and B report 
the return predictive ability of intuitional trading across VU tertiles during the optimistic and 
pessimistic market sentiment periods, respectively.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 shows that institutional return predictive ability in high VU (top VU tertile) stocks 
is sensitive to market sentiment. As shown in Panel A, the return predictive ability of institutional 
sell of high VU stocks during optimistic periods is significant over all holding periods. In contrast, 
the results in Panel B show that return predictability of institutional sell of high VU stocks is 
insignificant during pessimistic periods. Take 1/Firm age as example, for high VU stocks with 
Intense Sell during optimistic sentiment periods, the three-month DGTW return is statistically 
significant at –1.37%. In contrast, the three-month DGTW return is –0.23% and statistically 
insignificant for high VU stocks with intense institutional sell during pessimistic periods. Recall 
in Table 3, the DGTW return on the overall Intense Sell portfolio is –0.89%, which is notably less 
negative than the –1.37% return on the Intense Sell portfolio during optimistic periods. The 
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predictive ability of institutional Intense Sell of high VU stocks during high sentiment periods is 
significant across all our VU proxies, expect for 1/Size (reported in online appendix). 
Overall, the findings suggest that institutional return predictive ability for high VU stocks 
is mainly concentrated in sales completed during optimistic market sentiment periods. These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis that prices of high VU stocks are bid up by sentiment 
investors during optimistic periods and institutional investors are able to exploit such mispricing 
by selling these stocks during periods of high market sentiment. 
 
3.5 Sub-period Analysis  
To the extent that recent studies find evidence of diminishing return predictive ability of 
institutional investors (Barras et al. (2010)), we conduct sub-period analysis by splitting the sample 
into two sub-samples and report institutional return predictive ability during periods of high market 
sentiment. Results are presented in Table 6, with Panel A reporting results for 1981 to June 1996 
and Panel B for July 1996 to 2010.  
For both sub-periods, the return predictive ability remains significant for sells of high VU 
stocks during high sentiment periods. Take volatility as example, the three months DGTW-return 
on Intense Sell portfolio during optimistic period is –1.10% for the period from 1981 to June 1996 
and –1.73% for July 1996 to 2010 period. Therefore, the return predictability of institutional sells 
in high VU stocks during high sentiment periods remains significant over time.  
    [TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Robustness Tests 
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In this section, we conduct tests to verify that our main results from the previous sections 
are robust. We also investigate whether there are any relationship between institutional trading and 
future earnings news. This is to ascertain whether institutions’ abnormal trading performance is 
due to their access to information on earnings fundamentals. We also test whether institutions 
obtain information about stock fundamentals from analysts. 
 
4.1 Institutional Trading and Future Earnings News 
     In their study on mutual fund managers’ stock-picking ability, Baker, Litov, Wachter, and 
Wurgler (2010) find that the average fund’s recent buys significantly outperform its recent sells 
around the next earnings announcement. Their finding suggests that institutional investors’ 
informational advantage may come from their ability to forecast earnings-related fundamentals. 
To further investigate institutional investors’ informational advantage, we examine the 
relationship between institutional trading and future earnings news. We do so by examining the 3-
day window returns surrounding the earnings announcement date during the quarter subsequent to 
trading portfolio formation date, and the subsequent quarter’s earnings surprises.  
We obtain quarterly earnings announcement dates from COMPUSTAT. The earnings 
announcement abnormal return is defined as the cumulative DGTW-adjusted abnormal return over 
a 3-day window [–1, +1] around the earnings announcement date. As in the above tests, for each 
quarter, we group stocks into five portfolios based on ownership-stratified institutional trading 
quintiles then independently sort them into high, middle, and low level of VU. For each portfolio, 
we then calculate the mean announcement window abnormal returns for the quarter subsequent to 
institutional trading formation quarter. 
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We use two measures of earnings surprises. The first measure is the subsequent quarter’s 
earnings surprise, Standard Unexpected Earnings (SUE), which is based on a rolling seasonal 
random walk model after exclusion of special items, scaled by quarter-end stock price (Livnat and 
Mendenhall (2006)). Specifically, the SUE of a stock j in quarter t is SUEjt =(Xjt − Xjt-4)/ Pjt, where 
Xjt is primary Earnings Per Share (EPS) after exclusion of extraordinary items for firm j in quarter 
t, and Pjt is the price per share for firm j at the end of quarter t.  
The second earnings surprise measure is based on analyst forecast errors. We measure 
analyst forecast errors as the difference between actual earnings and the mean analyst forecast 
earnings scaled by quarter-end stock price. However, using analyst forecast errors will restrict our 
sample to relatively large firms that have analyst coverage. In addition, analysts may also be 
subjected to market sentiment and may have systematic errors in predicting firm’s earnings 
performance. For example, Hribar and McInnis (2012) documents evidence that when market 
sentiment is high (optimistic), analysts’ forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings and long-term 
earnings growth are relatively more optimistic for uncertain or difficult-to-value firms. They 
conclude that investor sentiment affects the earnings expectations of hard-to-value firms. 
 [TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 reports the subsequent quarter’s (1) earnings announcement abnormal returns and 
(2) earnings surprise (SUE), and (3) analyst forecast errors, conditioned on institutional trading for 
both high and low sentiment periods. Our results show that institutional sell in the high VU stocks 
during high sentiment periods predict significantly negative 3-day abnormal returns and negative 
earnings surprise (measured by both SUEs and analyst forecast errors) around the subsequent 
earnings announcements. In contrast, there is little consistent predictive power for institutional 
buys, and for low VU stocks or for low sentiment periods. These results suggest that institutions 
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are not necessarily timing the market sentiment but rather have predictive ability for stock 
fundamentals.  
 
4.2 Calendar Time Portfolio Alpha 
So far, we report DGTW-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in our main 
results. To address the concern that BHARs give a false inference of the price adjustment to an 
event (Fama (1998)), we have also reported the quarterly buy–and–hold returns over the four 
quarters after portfolio formation separately in Table 4, following Wermers (1999).  
However, to account for the possibility that the DGTW adjustment may be imprecise, we 
therefore report calendar-time portfolio alphas. Specifically, once stocks are assigned into 15 
portfolios at the quarter-end, the stocks are held in the portfolios for the next 3, 6 and 12 months, 
corresponding to the holding periods that we report in Table 3. We then derive the portfolio alpha 
from Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 8, we report the monthly calendar-time portfolio alphas (abnormal returns) for the 
top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading, i.e., Intense Buy and Intense Sell for top and 
bottom tertiles of VU groups. We also report the alphas on the hedge portfolios (Intense Buy minus 
Intense Sell). We report monthly alphas for both the three- and four-factor models.16 
Table 8 shows that the alphas from both the three- and four-factor models are significantly 
negative for Intense Sell portfolios for high VU stocks. When using volatility as VU proxy, for 
three-month holding period, the monthly alpha from the three-factor model is –0.59 (t=–4.42) on 
high VU Intense Sell portfolio and the monthly alpha from the four-factor model is –0.39 (t=–
                                                          
16 To save space, we omit the middle portfolios but results are available upon request. 
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3.47). In addition, the alphas on the hedge portfolios are significantly positive. Specifically, the 
alpha from three-factor model is 0.28 (t=2.16) and the alpha from four-factor model is 0.12 
(t=2.14). These results suggest that the main finding using DGTW-adjusted returns presented in 
Table 3 is robust using three-factor and four-factor abnormal returns. 
 
4.3  Regressions of Return Predictability  
To further verify that our results are not due to misspecification in the DGTW-adjusted 
returns or other factors that are found to be related to future returns, we run pooled regressions of 
raw returns on institutional “Intense_Sell” as a main explanatory (dummy) variable, along with a 
set of predictors used by Yan and Zhang (2009) and Gompers and Metrick (2001). To verify 
whether institutional Intense Sell can still predict future returns after controlling for other market 
anomalies, we also include accrual and asset growth in the previous year to the portfolio formation 
year as explanatory variables. We also include the consensus analyst earnings forecast revision 
(“Prior FR”) over the prior 3 months to the portfolio formation quarter to check if institutional 
sell’s predictive ability is driven by changes in analyst forecast. To save space, we only report the 
results for high VU stocks (top tertile VU stocks) based on the level of VU measure at the end of 
the quarter prior to portfolio formation.  
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
The results are reported in Table 9 Specification (1). The estimated coefficients on the 
“Intense Sell” dummy for high VU stocks are significantly negative for most VU proxies. When 
using return volatility as the VU proxy, the coefficient on the “Intense Sell” dummy for 3-month 
return regression for high VU stocks is –0.0139 and statistically significant (t=–3.90). T-statistics 
are based on firm and month double clustered errors. And the coefficient on the “Intense Sell” 
26 
 
dummy for 12-month return regression is –0.0267 (t=–3.61). In un-tabulated results, we find the 
coefficients on “Intense_Sell” are not significant for low VU stocks. These results suggest that our 
main finding is not driven by potentially mixing up mispricing with factor risk from the DGTW 
adjustment. 
In specification (2), we also include optimistic market sentiment dummy (“High_sent”) 
that takes on values zero for pessimistic and one for optimistic market sentiment periods, and the 
“High_sent” and “Intense Sell” interaction term (“High_sent*Intense_Sell”). We expect this 
interaction term to be negative, as suggested by our main argument that the predictive ability of 
institutional trading mainly comes from institutional sells of high VU stocks during high sentiment 
periods. Consistently, we find that the interaction terms are negative, and statistically significant 
across all the VU proxies. For example, using return volatility as the VU proxy, the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term “High_sent*Intense_Sell” for 3-month return of high VU stocks 
is –0.0800 and statistically significant (t=–12.56). And the coefficient on the interaction term for 
12-month return regression is –0.2442 (t=–19.79). Further, the estimated coefficients on the 
“Intense_Sell” become insignificant in specification (2), which suggests that when “High_Sent” 
takes on values zero (during low sentiment periods), institutional sells of high VU stocks do not 
predict significantly negative returns. This finding is consistent with the results in Table 5 that 
Intense Sell portfolios of high VU stocks during optimistic sentiment periods predict significantly 
negative future returns, whereas Intense Sell portfolios during pessimistic sentiment periods have 
no consistent return predictive ability. Collectively, the results are consistent with our central 
argument that market sentiment is the key driver of the overvaluation of high VU stocks, and that 
the predictive ability of institutions is mainly from their sells of high uncertainty stocks during 
high sentiment periods.  
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4.4 Institutional Trading and Analyst Forecast Revisions 
So far, we have shown consistent evidence that institutional investors are informed and 
their informational advantage is mainly from their ability to identify and sell overvalued, high VU 
stocks, especially during periods of high market sentiment. Their informational advantages can be 
due either to their access to more precise information or to their expertise in interpreting public 
information. In this section, we investigate how institutions obtain information regarding the future 
fundamentals of high VU stocks. In particular, we investigate whether or not institutions may be 
receiving the information from analysts.  
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 10, we report the analyst forecast revisions over the prior quarter, current quarter 
and subsequent quarter relative to the trading portfolio formation quarter for the top and bottom 
VU tertiles stocks. Following Zhang (2006) and Kasznik and Mcnichols (2002), we calculate 
current analyst revision as the change from the mean analyst forecast in the current quarter 
(institutional trading portfolio formation quarter) to the mean analyst forecast in the prior quarter, 
scaled by prior quarter-end stock price. Similarly, we calculate prior analyst revision as the change 
from the mean analyst forecast in the prior quarter to the two quarters before the trading portfolio 
formation quarter, scaled by prior two quarter-end price. We calculate subsequent analyst revision 
as the change from the mean analyst forecast in the subsequent quarter to the mean analyst forecast 
in the current quarter, scaled by the current quarter-end price. 
We partition these revisions based on institutional Intense Buy and Intense Sell portfolios. 
From Table 10, we observe that analysts significantly revise their forecast downward during the 
current quarter and subsequent quarter for firms in the Intense Sell portfolio. However, for the 
quarter prior to the portfolio formation date, we find that analysts forecast revision is negative but 
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statistically insignificant, and the magnitude of negative revision is much smaller as compared to 
the current and subsequent quarters. These results seem to suggest that institutions’ ability to 
predict future earnings fundamentals (reported in Table 7) are not likely due to institutions 
receiving earnings information from analysts.  
To further investigate whether institutions (in their sale of high VU stocks) obtained “tips” 
by analysts, we include in the pooled regression reported in Table 9 the consensus earnings forecast 
revision from the prior quarter. The coefficient on the Prior FR (prior quarter’s Forecast Revision) 
is positive but statistically insignificant. The institutional “Intense Sell” dummy remains 
significantly negative even after adding in analyst forecast revisions in the regression. Overall, 
these findings suggest that institutions may have additional and perhaps, unique resources to 
forecast stock fundamentals in addition to the information that is contained in analyst earnings 
forecasts.  
 
4.5 Return Predictability by Institutional Type 
Yan and Zhang (2009) documented evidence that short-term institutional investors, who 
have higher portfolio turnover rate, are generally more informed than long-term institutional 
investors. Given their findings, we test whether the institutional investors’ predictive ability varies 
across institutional types. More specifically, whether some institutions are better informed than 
others in exploiting mispriced stocks. 
We follow Bushee (2001) to classify institutions into “transient”, “quasi-indexer”, and 
“dedicated” institutions. The classification is based on their past investment patterns in terms of 
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portfolio turnover and diversiﬁcation. 17   Bushee (2001) argues that transient institutions are 
engaged in frequent trading and therefore are more active in security analysis and trading activities. 
Dedicated institutions behave like long-term value investors, who typically have a large stake in 
the firms they invest. Quasi-indexers are passive investors who hold highly diversified portfolios 
and therefore are not likely to engage in active security analysis.  
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 11, we present the return predictability by different types of institutional investors. 
Panel A reports the results for transient institutions, Panel B for quasi-indexers and Panel C for 
dedicated institutions. The table shows that both transient and dedicated institutions have 
predictive ability when they sell high VU stocks, and that transient institutions are even better 
informed than dedicated institutions. In contrast, we see little return predictive ability of quasi-
indexers. When proxied by 1/Firm age, transient institutional sell of high VU stocks predicts –
1.27% (t=–4.63) for 3-month DGTW returns and dedicated institutional sell predicts –0.90% (t=–
3.77) for 3-month DGTW returns. In contrast, quasi-indexers sell does not predict significant 
future returns.  
 
4.6 Institutional Ownership and Market Efficiency 
So far, we have shown that that institutional trading, especially their selling of high VU 
stocks during high sentiment periods predicts negative future returns. As such, their selling helps 
correct overvaluation of those high VU stocks and thereby improve price efficiency. This implies 
that intuitions may be contributing to increased market efficiency in general. Hence, we investigate 
                                                          
17 We wish to  thank Professor Brian Bushee for making the data available at 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html    
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whether stocks held by institutional agents are more efficient. In particular, we explore whether 
high VU stocks with high level of institutional ownership are less likely to get overvalued in the 
first place during high sentiment periods.18 For high sentiment periods, we sort stocks into quintiles 
based on levels of institutional ownership and track the subsequent returns for 3-months, 6-months, 
and 12-months respectively.  
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
             Table 12 reports the results. We can see that stocks with higher level of institutional 
ownership are less likely to get overvalued during periods of high sentiment, as the subsequent 
returns are not consistently significantly negative. In contrast, high VU stocks with low 
institutional ownership during high sentiment tend to have significantly negative returns for most 
of the VU proxies. For example, using volatility as proxy, the 3-month subsequent returns on high 
VU portfolio during high sentiment with low institutional ownership is –1.64% (t=–2.79). In 
contrast, for high VU stocks with high institutional ownership stocks the 3-month subsequent 
returns is –0.14% and statistically insignificant (t=–0.14). 
 
5. Conclusion 
If institutional investors have information advantage, they should be able to take advantage 
of their skilled security analysis to exploit any mispricing. Paradoxically, as institutional investors, 
who are the presumably sophisticated investors, have become the dominant investors in the equity 
market, equity market should become more efficient over time. Then it raises the question whether 
                                                          
18 The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of reasoning. 
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institutional investors in a more competitive market, still possess superior informational 
advantages or are better skilled in predicting stock returns.  
It has been documented that mispricing is generally attributed to market impediment to 
short selling. As such, mispriced stocks are mainly overpriced stocks resulting from investor 
optimism combined with short sale constraints. Given significant variation in market sentiments, 
overpricing will be more pronounced during periods when market sentiments are high. Specifically, 
highly valuation uncertain firms such as young, volatile firms are found to be more overpriced 
during periods of high investor sentiment and consequently will earn significantly lower 
subsequent returns. As a result, the sentiment-driven overvaluation in highly uncertain stocks 
provides both cross sectional and inter temporal implications for skilled security analysis. 
We hypothesize and provide evidence that stock selection skills of institutional investors 
are mainly concentrated in their trading in high VU stocks, particularly during periods of optimistic 
market sentiment. Specifically, we find that intense institutional sells of high VU stocks predict 
significantly negative subsequent returns, whereas we find no significant positive returns for stocks 
with intense institutional buys. Further, this predictive ability is largely concentrated in sells of 
high VU stocks completed during optimistic market sentiment periods. Sub-period analysis 
suggests that these results hold for more recent times, even though some studies have reported 
diminished superior trading skills of institutions. Our results also suggest that institutional trading 
improves equity market efficiency as their selling of uncertain stocks during high sentiment 
periods helps correct sentiment-driven overvaluation.  
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Figure 1 Market Sentiment 
Quarterly market sentiment index during the portfolio formation quarter is constructed by 
averaging the three months the monthly composite index of market sentiment developed by Baker 
and Wurgler (2006).  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the key variables. Size is the market capitalization at the end of each quarter. 
Book-to-Market is calculated as book value for the fiscal year ending before the most recent June 30, divided by 
market capitalization of December 31 during that fiscal year. Institutional Ownership is defined as the ratio of the sum 
of shares held by institutional investors at the end of a given quarter to the total number of shares outstanding. Firm 
Age is the number of months since the firm appears in CRSP. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of weekly 
returns over the year ending at the beginning of the portfolio formation quarter, where weekly return is measured from 
Thursday to Wednesday. Idiosyncratic Volatility is the quarterly average of idiosyncratic volatility, calculated as the 
product of (a) the standard deviation of the regression residuals of excess daily returns on the daily Fama-French three 
factors (FF3), and (b) the square root of the number of observations in the month. Daily Turnover is calculated as the 
quarterly average of the daily turnover of the stock during the trading quarter (NASDAQ adjusted). Cash Flow 
Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the past 5 years (with a minimum of 
3 years). Analyst Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of the firm’s EPS during the trading quarter. 
Panel B presents the pair-wise correlations between key variables, Pearson Correlation coefficients are shown above 
the diagonal, while Spearman correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal. Panel C presents the average 
institutional ownership and the average number of institutions holding the stocks in each tertile based on the level of 
VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio formation. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
  
Stock-
Quarters 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Q1 
Media
n 
Q3 Max 
Size ($MM) 356,430 1816.70 5346.53 8.92 75.30
00 
253.34 999.75 39613.72 
Book-to-Market -- BM 353,005 0.66 0.50 0.04 0.32 0.55 0.85 2.97 
Institutional Ownership -- 
IO (%) 
356,430 40.15 26.01 0.59 17.47 37.61 60.73 94.87 
Firm Age (Months) 356,430 211.40 184.32 12.00 80.01 154.98 277.90 1019.00 
Return Volatility (%) 356,417 10.15 5.50 2.56 6.14 8.86 12.77 30.18 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (%)  356,426 6.05 3.05 1.75 3.82 5.42 7.61 17.85 
Daily Turnover (%) 352,424 0.50 0.59 0.01 0.13 0.29 0.62 3.29 
Cash Flow Volatility (%) 326,934 7.29 7.01 0.67 3.08 5.20 8.89 43.74 
Analyst Dispersion (%) 158,201 3.90 7.33 0.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 54.00 
 
Panel B: Correlation 
Variable IO 
Firm 
Age Volatility 
Idiosync
ratic Turnover 
Cash 
Flow 
Volatil
ity 
Size BM Dispersion 
IO 1 0.17 -0.02 -0.17 0.28 -0.01 0.14 -0.13 -0.01 
Firm Age 0.24 1 -0.04 -0.23 -0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.06 -0.01 
Volatility 0.00 -0.27 1 0.23 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
Idiosyncratic -0.17 -0.35 0.73 1 0.25 0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.01 
Turnover 0.54 -0.08 0.42 0.24 1 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.00 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.10 -0.20 0.36 0.37 0.17 1 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Size 0.68 0.33 -0.13 -0.34 0.40 -0.27 1 -0.07 0.00 
BM -0.17 0.14 -0.23 -0.11 -0.35 -0.14 -0.32 1 0.00 
Dispersion 0.04 0.16 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.25 1 
          
Panel C: Institutional Ownership and Number of Institutions Holding 
 High VU  Mid VU  Low VU 
 Ownership No. held  Ownership No. held  Ownership No. held 
1/Age 32.71% 45.79  36.48% 59.73  44.38% 131.10 
Volatility 35.77% 57.66  40.76% 72.71  36.98% 105.34 
Idiosyncratic 30.71% 38.95  40.57% 69.99  42.27% 126.92 
Turnover 50.17% 106.46  42.40% 105.83  22.11% 26.74 
Cash Flow Volatility 36.83% 59.58  42.70% 88.34  42.77% 122.16 
1/Size 29.14% 27.43  50.56% 94.16  57.42% 286.87 
1/BM 43.12% 112.01  39.68% 84.66  34.63% 51.37 
Dispersion 54.12% 143.12  53.72% 139.63  53.30% 124.66 
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Table 2 Institutional Trades and Future Stock Returns 
This table reports the subsequent returns on portfolios sorted by the quarterly initial-ownership-stratified 
changes in institutional ownership. Specifically, all eligible NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted into 
quintiles based on the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors (IO) at the end of prior quarter. 
Stocks within each initial IO-sorted portfolio are further sorted into quintiles based on changes in IO during 
current quarter. Stocks in the quintile of largest increase (decrease) in IO within each initial-IO quintile are 
then aggregated across the initial-IO-sorted quintiles to form 5 initial-ownership-stratified, largest increase 
(decrease) in IO portfolios. Intense Buy represents the largest increase in institutional ownership. Intense 
Sell represents the largest decrease in institutional ownership. The time-series average of buy-and-hold 
returns for the top and bottom quintiles as well as the difference between the top and bottom quintiles 
(Intense Sell – Buy) are reported. Raw returns and DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns are reported. All 
returns are in percentage. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted by Newey-West serial correlation up to 4 
lags. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold.  
 
 
Raw Return  DGTW-Adjusted Return 
3 Months 6 Months One Year   3 Months 6 Months One Year 
Intense Buy   3.37 6.99 14.20  0.06 0.16 -0.36 
 (3.22) (3.90) (4.43)  (0.46) (0.71) (-0.81) 
Intense Sell 2.94 6.06 13.19  -0.20 -0.67 -1.16 
 (3.00) (3.60) (4.48)  (-1.28) (-2.24) (-2.01) 
Intense  0.43 0.93 1.01  0.26 0.83 0.82 
Buy–Sell (1.70) (1.97) (1.22)  (1.13) (1.84) (1.03) 
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Table 3 Valuation Uncertainty and Return Predictability of Institutional Trading 
This table reports the return predictive ability of institutional trading, conditional on different levels of valuation uncertainty. At the end of each 
quarter, all eligible NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted based on their rankings of the initial-ownership-stratified changes in institutional 
ownership and independently sorted into tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio formation. Within each VU 
tertile, time series average of the buy-and-hold DGTW-adjusted returns of the top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading as well as the 
differences of top and bottom institutional trading quintiles are reported. All returns are in percentage. T-statistics are adjusted by Newey-West serial 
correlation up to 4 lags. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
 3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
IU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.21 0.27 0.06 -0.27   -0.33 0.64 0.31 -0.65   -1.20 0.56 0.07 -1.27 
 (-0.56) (1.49) (0.20) (-0.43)  (-0.45) (2.03) (0.56) (-0.53)  (-0.81) (0.90) (0.06) (-0.50) 
Intense Sell -0.89 0.08 0.49 -1.38  -1.94 -0.07 0.35 -2.29  -3.00 -0.18 0.13 -3.13 
 (-2.75) (0.34) (1.54) (-2.50)  (-3.59) (-0.14) (0.56) (-2.25)  (-3.34) (-0.20) (0.10) (-1.70) 
Intense  0.68 0.18 -0.43 1.11  1.60 0.70 -0.04 1.64  1.81 0.74 -0.06 1.86 
Buy-Sell (1.80) (0.73) (-2.26) (2.83)  (2.16) (1.47) (-0.14) (2.32)  (1.34) (0.97) (-0.12) (1.54) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy 0.05 -0.07 0.14 -0.09   0.07 0.34 0.21 -0.15   -0.66 0.32 -0.07 -0.59 
 (0.13) (-0.32) (0.43) (-0.14)  (0.09) (0.92) (0.33) (-0.11)  (-0.44) (0.47) (-0.05) (-0.22) 
Intense Sell -0.99 0.29 0.49 -1.48  -1.98 -0.03 0.50 -2.48  -3.25 -0.18 0.57 -3.83 
 (-2.70) (1.21) (1.25) (-2.19)  (-3.31) (-0.05) (0.67) (-2.07)  (-3.36) (-0.17) (0.39) (-1.74) 
Intense  1.04 -0.36 -0.35 1.39  2.05 0.36 -0.29 2.34  2.59 0.49 -0.65 3.23 
Buy-Sell (2.84) (-1.71) (-1.78) (3.71)   (2.81) (0.96) (-0.90) (3.55)   (2.10) (0.66) (-1.36) (3.04) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.90 -0.03 1.59 -2.48   -1.48 -0.31 4.00 -5.48   -3.89 -1.15 7.92 -11.81 
 (-3.12) (-0.12) (4.40) (-5.23)  (-3.10) (-0.73) (5.99) (-6.52)  (-3.96) (-2.00) (6.44) (-7.09) 
Intense Sell -1.26 -0.07 1.77 -3.03  -2.86 -0.43 3.21 -6.07  -4.62 -0.81 6.92 -11.55 
 (-4.35) (-0.23) (5.57) (-7.27)  (-5.02) (-1.08) (7.03) (-8.64)  (-5.51) (-1.06) (8.56) (-9.19) 
Intense  0.37 0.03 -0.18 0.55  1.38 0.12 0.79 0.59  0.74 -0.34 1.00 -0.26 
Buy-Sell (1.04) (0.08) (-0.43) (1.10)   (2.04) (0.20) (1.19) (0.75)   (0.83) (-0.32) (1.01) (-0.23) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy 0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0.03   0.37 0.37 0.15 0.21   0.32 0.26 0.64 -0.32 
 (0.04) (-0.46) (-0.02) (0.04)  (0.43) (0.87) (0.33) (0.17)  (0.18) (0.34) (0.90) (-0.14) 
Intense Sell -0.84 0.24 0.19 -1.03  -1.83 0.21 0.22 -2.05  -1.68 0.98 0.79 -2.47 
 (-1.84) (0.91) (0.70) (-1.59)  (-2.61) (0.39) (0.47) (-1.97)  (-1.33) (1.03) (0.90) (-1.27) 
Intense  0.86 -0.37 -0.19 1.05  2.19 0.16 -0.07 2.26  2.00 -0.72 -0.15 2.15 
Buy-Sell (1.78) (-1.20) (-0.81) (1.91)   (2.62) (0.27) (-0.21) (2.52)   (1.49) (-0.97) (-0.28) (1.64) 
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Table 4 Subsequent Quarterly Returns and Long-run Returns on Institutional Trading Portfolios: 
High Valuation Uncertainty Stocks Only  
This table reports the subsequent quarterly returns and long term returns on portfolios sorted by initial-
institutional-ownership-stratified changes in institutional ownership. At the end of each quarter, all eligible 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted based on initial-ownership-stratified change in institutional 
ownership and independently sorted into tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior 
to portfolio formation. Quarterly buy-and-hold DGTW benchmark adjusted returns during the second, third 
and fourth quarter after the formation date as well as two-year holding period from one year after portfolio 
formation are reported for the top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading, and the differences of the 
top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading. We report the portfolios for the top VU tertile stocks only. 
All returns are in percentage. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
 
  QTR+1 QTR+2 QTR+3 QTR+4 
QTR+5 
through 
QTR+12 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy 0.10 -0.28 -0.75 -0.57 -2.08 
 (0.35) (-0.96) (-2.85) (-1.72) (-1.15) 
Intense Sell -0.88 -1.04 -0.73 -0.57 -2.28 
 (-3.31) (-3.64) (-2.41) (-1.67) (-1.24) 
Intense  0.98 0.77 -0.02 0.00 0.21 
Buy-Sell (2.60) (2.22) (-0.07) (-0.01) (0.12) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy 0.05 -0.06 -0.38 -0.34 -0.71 
 (0.13) (-0.14) (-0.92) (-0.78) (-0.26) 
Intense Sell -0.99 -0.94 -0.57 -0.47 -0.57 
 (-2.70) (-2.26) (-1.32) (-1.08) (-0.29) 
Intense  1.04 0.88 0.19 0.12 -0.14 
Buy-Sell (2.84) (2.43) (0.67) (0.39) (-0.07) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.86 -0.51 -0.74 -1.22 -6.53 
 (-3.04) (-1.47) (-1.83) (-2.78) (-2.85) 
Intense Sell -1.26 -1.59 -1.10 -0.75 -5.19 
 (-4.46) (-4.07) (-3.07) (-1.86) (-2.11) 
Intense  0.41 1.08 0.36 -0.47 -1.35 
Buy-Sell (1.17) (2.11) (0.87) (-1.08) (-1.11) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy 0.02 0.22 0.00 -0.06 3.94 
 (0.04) (0.54) (-0.01) (-0.13) (1.20) 
Intense Sell -0.84 -0.66 -0.03 0.41 4.17 
 (-1.84) (-1.27) (-0.05) (0.86) (1.77) 
Intense  0.86 0.89 0.02 -0.47 -0.24 
Buy-Sell (1.78) (2.09) (0.06) (-1.19) (-0.08) 
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Table 5 Market Sentiment and Informativeness of Institutional Trades 
This table reports the informativeness of institutional trades across VU tertiles during optimistic versus pessimistic market sentiment periods. At the end of each 
quarter, all eligible NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted based on their rankings of the initial-ownership-stratified changes in institutional ownership and 
independently sorted into tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio formation. Within each VU tertile, time series average of 
the buy-and-hold DGTW-adjusted returns of the top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading as well as the differences of top and bottom institutional trading 
quintiles are reported. Panel A reports results for optimistic and Panel B reports results for pessimistic sentiment periods. T-statistics are adjusted by Newey-West 
serial correlation up to 4 lags. All returns are in percentage. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
Panel A: Optimistic Market Sentiment Periods 
 3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.04 0.26 -0.19 0.15  -0.80 0.93 -0.12 -0.68  -1.93 1.40 -1.04 -0.89 
 (-0.08) (1.19) (-0.80) (0.31)  (-1.15) (2.68) (-0.33) (-0.91)  (-1.38) (2.06) (-1.70) (-0.51) 
Intense Sell -1.37 0.03 0.31 -1.68  -2.24 -0.31 0.13 -2.36  -3.88 -0.34 -0.18 -3.70 
 (-3.85) (0.11) (1.31) (-3.71)  (-4.58) (-0.62) (0.32) (-3.60)  (-4.28) (-0.38) (-0.19) (-3.19) 
Intense  1.33 0.23 -0.50 1.83  1.44 1.24 -0.24 1.68  1.95 1.74 -0.85 2.80 
Buy-Sell (2.67) (0.67) (-1.67) (3.76)  (1.85) (1.97) (-0.45) (2.34)  (1.17) (1.52) (-0.80) (1.61) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy -0.59 0.12 0.84 -1.43  -1.37 0.59 2.00 -3.37  -2.06 0.45 2.32 -4.38 
 (-1.11) (0.43) (2.06) (-1.62)  (-1.35) (1.28) (2.85) (-2.05)  (-0.89) (0.55) (1.25) (-1.08) 
Intense Sell -1.72 0.56 1.07 -2.79  -3.27 0.38 1.86 -5.13  -5.23 0.01 2.79 -8.02 
 (-3.21) (1.86) (2.03) (-2.87)  (-4.29) (0.69) (1.96) (-3.35)  (-4.55) (0.01) (1.32) (-2.66) 
Intense  1.13 -0.44 -0.23 1.36  1.90 0.21 0.13 1.77  3.18 0.44 -0.47 3.64 
Buy-Sell (2.31) (-1.42) (-0.81) (2.52)  (2.00) (0.41) (0.30) (1.98)  (1.90) (0.42) (-0.63) (2.49) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -1.10 -0.21 1.32 -2.42  -2.02 -0.60 3.55 -5.57  -4.41 -1.87 6.99 -11.39 
 (-2.60) (-0.54) (2.55) (-3.71)  (-3.32) (-0.93) (3.49) (-5.01)  (-3.02) (-2.23) (4.48) (-4.94) 
Intense Sell -1.84 0.05 1.99 -3.83  -3.99 -0.48 3.30 -7.29  -5.54 -1.13 6.86 -12.40 
 (-4.81) (0.13) (3.99) (-6.17)  (-5.49) (-1.00) (5.76) (-8.37)  (-4.67) (-1.17) (5.38) (-7.44) 
Intense  0.73 -0.26 -0.68 1.41  1.97 -0.13 0.25 1.72  1.13 -0.74 0.13 1.00 
Buy-Sell (1.41) (-0.50) (-0.98) (1.76)  (2.17) (-0.16) (0.24) (1.48)  (0.91) (-0.59) (0.11) (0.56) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy -0.84 -0.03 0.33 -1.18  -1.39 0.77 1.06 -2.45  -1.80 0.79 1.72 -3.53 
 (-1.19) (-0.06) (0.81) (-1.17)  (-1.17) (1.02) (1.59) (-1.46)  (-0.68) (0.61) (1.51) (-1.02) 
Intense Sell -1.37 0.30 0.42 -1.78  -3.50 -0.08 1.08 -4.58  -3.91 0.43 2.52 -6.44 
 (-1.81) (0.94) (1.00) (-1.68)  (-3.49) (-0.11) (1.48) (-2.90)  (-2.00) (0.28) (2.02) (-2.17) 
Intense  0.52 -0.33 -0.08 0.61  2.11 0.85 -0.01 2.12  2.11 0.36 -0.80 2.91 
Buy-Sell (0.76) (-0.63) (-0.24) (0.76)  (2.18) (0.87) (-0.03) (2.06)  (1.28) (0.34) (-0.93) (1.83) 
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Panel B: Pessimistic Market Sentiment Periods 
 3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
 
High 
VU 
Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
 
High 
VU 
Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy 0.29 0.35 -0.40 0.69  0.94 0.58 -1.02 1.96  0.11 0.12 -2.12 2.23 
 (0.74) (1.25) (-1.79) (1.30)  (1.49) (1.16) (-2.54) (2.32)  (0.10) (0.13) (-2.79) (1.55) 
Intense Sell -0.23 -0.02 -0.29 0.05  -1.18 -0.31 -0.66 -0.52  -1.73 -0.24 -1.62 -0.11 
 (-0.61) (-0.07) (-0.80) (0.11)  (-2.00) (-0.52) (-0.96) (-0.75)  (-1.55) (-0.23) (-1.32) (-0.12) 
Intense  0.52 0.37 -0.12 0.64  2.11 0.89 -0.36 2.47  1.84 0.36 -0.50 2.34 
Buy-Sell (0.90) (0.82) (-0.32) (0.99)  (2.19) (1.03) (-0.55) (2.93)  (1.10) (0.30) (-0.55) (1.69) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy 0.90 -0.31 -0.78 1.68  1.96 0.00 -2.14 4.10  1.18 0.14 -3.23 4.41 
 (1.71) (-1.05) (-1.55) (1.74)  (2.24) (0.01) (-2.46) (2.62)  (1.03) (0.15) (-2.12) (2.01) 
Intense Sell -0.03 -0.06 -0.27 0.24  -0.29 -0.56 -1.30 1.01  -0.64 -0.41 -2.35 1.71 
 (-0.07) (-0.14) (-0.48) (0.28)  (-0.35) (-0.70) (-1.41) (0.68)  (-0.48) (-0.32) (-1.59) (0.79) 
Intense  0.93 -0.26 -0.51 1.44  2.25 0.56 -0.84 3.09  1.81 0.55 -0.88 2.70 
Buy-Sell (1.66) (-0.96) (-1.94) (2.82)  (2.02) (1.01) (-2.18) (3.13)  (1.09) (0.61) (-2.36) (1.77) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.68 0.15 1.87 -2.55  -0.92 0.00 4.46 -5.38  -3.34 -0.40 8.89 -12.24 
 (-1.76) (0.40) (3.70) (-3.65)  (-1.38) (-0.01) (4.84) (-4.11)  (-3.02) (-0.54) (4.89) (-5.13) 
Intense Sell -0.67 -0.19 1.53 -2.20  -1.69 -0.39 3.11 -4.80  -3.67 -0.48 6.99 -10.66 
 (-1.57) (-0.45) (3.94) (-4.11)  (-2.12) (-0.61) (4.64) (-4.72)  (-2.89) (-0.41) (7.22) (-5.75) 
Intense  -0.01 0.34 0.34 -0.35  0.77 0.38 1.36 -0.59  0.33 0.08 1.90 -1.57 
Buy-Sell (-0.02) (0.54) (0.72) (-0.62)  (0.91) (0.42) (1.51) (-0.57)  (0.32) (0.05) (1.34) (-1.37) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy 0.87 -0.24 -0.34 1.21  2.09 -0.02 -0.74 2.82  2.41 -0.25 -0.42 2.82 
 (1.40) (-0.68) (-1.16) (1.48)  (2.12) (-0.04) (-1.28) (2.00)  (1.44) (-0.43) (-0.57) (1.33) 
Intense Sell -0.33 0.18 -0.04 -0.29  -0.19 0.50 -0.62 0.43  0.51 1.53 -0.91 1.42 
 (-0.63) (0.43) (-0.13) (-0.39)  (-0.22) (0.68) (-1.12) (0.37)  (0.42) (1.59) (-0.99) (0.85) 
Intense  1.20 -0.42 -0.30 1.49  2.28 -0.51 -0.12 2.39  1.89 -1.78 0.49 1.40 
Buy-Sell (1.75) (-1.16) (-0.92) (1.94)  (1.84) (-0.83) (-0.23) (1.79)  (1.05) (-1.94) (0.73) (0.75) 
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Table 6 Sub-Period Analysis for Optimistic Market Sentiment Periods 
This table reports sub-period analysis for the informativeness of institutional trades completed during optimistic sentiment periods only. At the end of each quarter, 
all eligible NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted based on their rankings of the initial-ownership-stratified changes in institutional ownership and 
independently sorted into tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio formation. Within each VU tertile, time series average of 
the buy-and-hold DGTW-adjusted returns of the top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading as well as the differences of top and bottom institutional trading 
quintiles are reported. Panel A reports results for year 1981 through June 1996. Panel B reports results for July 1996 through year 2010. T-statistics are adjusted 
by Newey-West serial correlation up to 4 lags. All returns are in percentage. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
Panel A: 1981-June 1996 
 3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  High VU Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.45 0.11 -0.12 -0.33  -1.01 0.82 0.24 -1.26  -2.52 2.02 0.93 -3.45 
 (-0.90) (0.40) (-0.41) (-0.51)  (-1.07) (1.95) (0.57) (-1.17)  (-1.56) (2.67) (1.47) (-1.81) 
Intense Sell -0.49 0.27 -0.09 -0.40  -1.53 -0.27 -0.42 -1.11  -2.75 -0.36 -1.25 -1.50 
 (-0.91) (1.02) (-0.22) (-0.61)  (-2.18) (-0.43) (-0.62) (-1.10)  (-3.08) (-0.53) (-1.17) (-0.96) 
Intense  0.04 -0.16 -0.03 0.08  0.51 1.08 0.66 -0.15  0.23 2.38 2.18 -1.95 
Buy-Sell (0.07) (-0.60) (-0.08) (0.11)  (0.55) (1.81) (1.26) (-0.16)  (0.16) (3.68) (2.74) (-0.93) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy -0.43 -0.33 0.52 -0.96  -0.60 -0.14 1.51 -2.10  -2.32 0.68 3.85 -6.17 
 (-0.89) (-0.94) (1.25) (-1.24)  (-0.64) (-0.33) (2.26) (-1.47)  (-3.00) (1.26) (5.04) (-4.50) 
Intense Sell -1.10 0.31 1.14 -2.24  -2.67 -0.18 1.91 -4.59  -5.15 -0.59 3.98 -9.13 
 (-2.40) (0.79) (2.15) (-2.78)  (-4.20) (-0.25) (2.46) (-4.10)  (-7.97) (-0.52) (3.71) (-5.68) 
Intense  0.67 -0.64 -0.61 1.28  2.08 0.04 -0.41 2.48  2.83 1.27 -0.14 2.96 
Buy-Sell (1.05) (-1.32) (-1.84) (1.70)  (1.81) (0.07) (-0.75) (1.91)  (4.05) (1.56) (-0.13) (2.26) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.66 -0.43 1.12 -1.78  -0.92 -1.04 2.23 -3.15  -1.16 -1.92 5.27 -6.42 
 (-1.37) (-0.71) (1.92) (-2.16)  (-1.33) (-1.01) (2.32) (-2.20)  (-0.81) (-1.44) (2.89) (-2.43) 
Intense Sell -0.85 -0.92 0.90 -1.75  -2.99 -1.64 2.21 -5.20  -4.98 -4.29 3.27 -8.25 
 (-1.65) (-1.71) (1.91) (-2.44)  (-3.04) (-2.13) (4.00) (-5.19)  (-2.14) (-4.59) (3.97) (-3.15) 
Intense  0.19 0.49 0.22 -0.03  2.06 0.61 0.02 2.05  3.82 2.37 1.99 1.83 
Buy-Sell (0.31) (0.54) (0.28) (-0.04)  (2.89) (0.52) (0.03) (1.49)  (2.03) (1.83) (0.89) (0.63) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy -0.38 0.10 -0.07 -0.31  -0.38 0.56 0.30 -0.68  0.33 1.70 1.62 -1.29 
 (-0.54) (0.27) (-0.15) (-0.32)  (-0.36) (0.75) (0.56) (-0.51)  (0.16) (1.90) (2.22) (-0.57) 
Intense Sell -2.08 -0.08 0.09 -2.17  -3.63 -0.11 -0.16 -3.47  -6.06 -1.02 1.93 -7.99 
 (-3.82) (-0.19) (0.22) (-2.90)  (-2.98) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-2.14)  (-3.20) (-1.12) (2.21) (-3.40) 
Intense  1.70 0.18 -0.16 1.86  3.24 0.67 0.45 2.79  6.39 2.72 -0.31 6.70 
Buy-Sell (2.36) (0.36) (-0.31) (2.41)  (3.13) (0.88) (0.83) (2.53)  (3.09) (3.05) (-0.44) (2.96) 
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Panel B: July 1996-2010 
 3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-Low   
High 
VU 
Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-Low   
High 
VU 
Mid VU 
Low 
VU 
High-Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.13 0.24 -0.31 0.18  -0.94 0.68 -0.57 -0.36  -1.22 0.49 -2.61 1.39 
 (-0.22) (0.68) (-0.81) (0.24)  (-0.93) (1.56) (-0.99) (-0.30)  (-0.50) (0.59) (-3.25) (0.46) 
Intense Sell -1.20 -0.02 0.70 -1.91  -1.90 -0.15 0.86 -2.76  -3.06 -0.24 1.24 -4.30 
 (-2.35) (-0.03) (1.96) (-2.75)  (-2.76) (-0.17) (1.60) (-2.96)  (-2.50) (-0.15) (0.86) (-3.15) 
Intense  1.07 0.26 -1.02 2.09  0.96 0.83 -1.43 2.40  1.83 0.73 -3.85 5.69 
Buy-Sell (1.66) (0.44) (-2.17) (3.27)  (0.83) (0.86) (-1.93) (2.08)  (0.60) (0.43) (-3.83) (2.17) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy -1.02 0.48 1.08 -2.10  -2.48 0.99 2.51 -4.99  -2.48 0.15 1.39 -3.87 
 (-1.11) (1.03) (1.44) (-1.31)  (-1.51) (1.32) (1.96) (-1.77)  (-0.58) (0.12) (0.40) (-0.51) 
Intense Sell -1.73 0.84 1.07 -2.80  -2.92 0.65 2.32 -5.24  -3.98 0.49 2.52 -6.50 
 (-1.73) (1.57) (1.13) (-1.54)  (-2.06) (0.67) (1.44) (-1.84)  (-1.95) (0.18) (0.70) (-1.19) 
Intense  0.71 -0.36 0.01 0.70  0.44 0.34 0.19 0.25  1.50 -0.34 -1.13 2.63 
Buy-Sell (0.91) (-0.78) (0.03) (0.78)  (0.34) (0.41) (0.30) (0.18)  (0.58) (-0.20) (-1.34) (1.03) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -1.36 -0.09 1.43 -2.79  -2.65 -0.35 4.31 -6.96  -6.28 -1.84 7.98 -14.26 
 (-2.23) (-0.17) (1.91) (-3.04)  (-3.16) (-0.42) (2.91) (-4.82)  (-3.43) (-1.66) (3.72) (-5.00) 
Intense Sell -2.41 0.61 2.62 -5.03  -4.57 0.20 3.93 -8.50  -5.87 0.69 8.92 -14.79 
 (-4.79) (1.15) (3.64) (-6.10)  (-4.69) (0.35) (4.83) (-7.39)  (-4.62) (0.70) (5.67) (-9.14) 
Intense  1.04 -0.70 -1.20 2.24  1.92 -0.55 0.38 1.54  -0.41 -2.53 -0.94 0.53 
Buy-Sell (1.41) (-1.10) (-1.21) (1.99)  (1.39) (-0.51) (0.26) (0.92)  (-0.29) (-1.63) (-0.71) (0.23) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy -1.11 -0.10 0.57 -1.68  -1.97 0.89 1.50 -3.47  -3.04 0.26 1.78 -4.82 
 (-1.06) (-0.14) (0.95) (-1.13)  (-1.12) (0.80) (1.51) (-1.38)  (-0.76) (0.13) (1.01) (-0.91) 
Intense Sell -0.96 0.52 0.61 -1.56  -3.43 -0.06 1.79 -5.21  -2.68 1.26 2.87 -5.54 
 (-0.83) (1.18) (0.98) (-0.96)  (-2.40) (-0.07) (1.72) (-2.26)  (-0.95) (0.53) (1.50) (-1.24) 
Intense  -0.16 -0.62 -0.04 -0.12  1.46 0.95 -0.28 1.74  -0.36 -1.00 -1.09 0.73 
Buy-Sell (-0.17) (-0.81) (-0.09) (-0.10)  (1.05) (0.64) (-0.48) (1.16)  (-0.19) (-0.72) (-0.84) (0.41) 
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Table 7 Institutional Trading and Future Earnings News 
This table reports the DGTW-adjusted abnormal returns over the three days around the subsequent earnings announcement dates and the earnings 
surprises during the quarter subsequent to trading portfolio formation quarter. SUE is Standard Unexpected Earnings based on a rolling seasonal 
random walk model after exclusion of special items, scaled by prior quarter-end stock price. Forecast Error is measured as actual earnings minus 
mean analyst earnings forecast scaled by prior quarter-end stock price.  All returns and earnings surprise measures are in percentage, and statistically 
significant at 10% are in bold.  
 Optimistic Sentiment Periods   Pessimistic Sentiment Periods 
  High VU   Low VU   High VU   Low VU 
  CAR 
(-1,+1) 
SUE Forecast 
Error 
 CAR 
(-1,+1) 
SUE Forecast 
Error 
 CAR 
(-1,+1) 
SUE Forecast 
Error 
 CAR 
(-1,+1) 
SUE Forecast 
Error 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.08 0.13 -0.07  -0.01 0.04 -0.21  0.09 0.57 -0.09  -0.15 0.83 -0.02 
 (-0.72) (1.51) (-1.24)  (-0.14) (0.61) (-2.74)  (1.07) (3.35) (-1.38)  (-1.68) (2.05) (-0.87) 
Intense Sell -0.28 -0.43 -0.45  -0.07 -0.16 -0.08  -0.15 -0.26 -0.32  -0.07 -0.16 -0.10 
 (-2.33) (-4.47) (-4.04)  (-0.78) (-1.54) (-1.29)  (-1.48) (-1.72) (-4.37)  (-1.01) (-1.19) (-1.14) 
Intense  0.21 0.57 0.39  0.06 0.21 -0.13  0.25 0.83 0.23  -0.07 0.99 0.08 
Buy-Sell (1.15) (4.84) (3.32)  (0.46) (2.08) (-1.71)  (1.91) (4.90) (2.48)  (-0.65) (2.55) (0.90) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy -0.09 0.17 -0.20  0.06 0.12 -0.08  -0.18 3.13 -0.04  0.06 0.01 -0.10 
 (-0.85) (1.90) (-2.28)  (0.78) (1.62) (-1.70)  (-1.66) (1.45) (-0.56)  (0.78) (0.25) (-1.01) 
Intense Sell -0.43 -0.56 -0.37  -0.01 -0.09 -0.08  -0.24 3.72 -0.38  -0.12 -0.01 0.01 
 (-4.25) (-4.22) (-5.00)  (-0.14) (-1.29) (-1.67)  (-2.29) (0.91) (-5.58)  (-1.81) (-0.29) (0.13) 
Intense  0.34 0.73 0.16  0.07 0.20 0.00  0.06 -0.59 0.34  0.18 0.02 -0.12 
Buy-Sell (2.34) (5.36) (1.37)  (0.81) (2.06) (0.11)  (0.44) (-0.13) (4.82)  (1.92) (0.39) (-0.87) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.20 -0.27 -0.36  0.66 0.10 -0.03  -0.07 0.56 -0.10  0.56 0.28 0.06 
 (-1.41) (-1.60) (-2.62)  (4.28) (1.91) (-1.09)  (-0.52) (2.06) (-1.34)  (4.63) (4.00) (4.87) 
Intense Sell -0.47 -0.85 -0.54  -0.03 -0.07 -0.11  -0.22 -0.82 -0.48  0.19 -0.05 -0.08 
 (-3.51) (-4.11) (-4.52)  (-0.18) (-0.92) (-2.28)  (-1.60) (-3.68) (-4.35)  (1.14) (-0.65) (-2.59) 
Intense  0.28 0.57 0.19  0.69 0.17 0.08  0.15 1.38 0.38  0.36 0.34 0.14 
Buy-Sell (1.38) (2.48) (1.13)  (2.69) (2.02) (1.70)  (0.80) (6.34) (3.23)  (1.71) (4.73) (4.41) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy 0.12 -0.06 -0.24  0.11 -0.04 -0.07  0.27 0.54 -0.08  -0.03 0.06 -0.02 
 (0.82) (-0.63) (-2.42)  (1.14) (-0.76) (-1.71)  (1.88) (2.34) (-0.81)  (-0.35) (1.05) (-0.52) 
Intense Sell -0.07 -0.93 -4.33  0.00 -0.08 -0.07  -0.18 -0.19 -0.45  -0.09 -0.14 0.00 
 (-0.54) (-5.29) (-2.16)  (0.01) (-0.94) (-1.63)  (-1.17) (-0.52) (-5.50)  (-1.16) (-1.08) (0.25) 
Intense  0.20 0.87 4.08  0.11 0.04 0.00  0.45 0.73 0.37  0.05 0.21 -0.02 
Buy-Sell (1.00) (5.60) (4.12)  (0.92) (0.37) (-0.02)  (2.16) (2.49) (2.89)  (0.46) (1.88) (-0.65) 
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Table 8 Alpha from Fama-French Three-Factor and Carhart Four-Factor Models 
This table reports the monthly calendar-time portfolio alphas (abnormal returns) from Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. Stocks are assigned 
into 15 portfolios at the quarter-end and hold for 3, 6 and 12 months. Monthly alphas for the top and bottom quintiles of institutional trading as well as the 
differences of top and bottom institutional trading quintiles are reported, within each VU tertile based on the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to 
portfolio formation. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported and returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
  Fama-French 3-Factors Model 
 
 
 
 
  Carhart 4-Factor Model 
 
 
 
 
 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months  3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 
  High VU Low VU High VU Low VU High VU Low VU High VU Low VU High VU Low VU High VU Low VU 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.07 0.10 -0.08 0.11 -0.10 0.09  -0.06 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.14 
 (-0.85) (1.44) (-1.01) (1.56) (-1.21) (1.45)  (-0.61) (1.63) (0.02) (2.10) (0.10) (2.34) 
Intense Sell -0.43 -0.01 -0.43 0.00 -0.36 0.00  -0.29 0.11 -0.23 0.12 -0.13 0.11 
 (-3.94) (-0.10) (-4.14) (-0.06) (-3.29) (-0.03)  (-3.18) (1.23) (-2.29) (1.52) (-1.13) (1.55) 
Intense  0.36 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.26 0.09  0.23 0.02 0.23 0.04 0.14 0.03 
Buy-Sell (2.96) (1.50) (3.85) (2.27) (3.34) (2.18)  (1.90) (0.59) (2.57) (0.98) (1.71) (1.47) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy -0.31 0.25 -0.26 0.26 -0.24 0.26  -0.27 0.24 -0.08 0.25 -0.03 0.27 
 (-2.68) (3.25) (-2.40) (3.40) (-2.21) (3.21)  (-2.77) (2.54) (-0.78) (2.80) (-0.25) (3.11) 
Intense Sell -0.59 0.33 -0.59 0.31 -0.51 0.29  -0.39 0.37 -0.30 0.32 -0.19 0.31 
 (-4.42) (3.72) (-4.58) (3.84) (-3.72) (3.67)  (-3.47) (3.25) (-2.45) (3.19) (-1.36) (3.28) 
Intense  0.28 -0.08 0.33 -0.05 0.27 -0.03  0.12 -0.13 0.22 -0.07 0.16 -0.04 
Buy-Sell (2.16) (-2.31) (3.74) (-1.10) (3.06) (-0.65)  (2.14) (-2.64) (2.51) (-1.50) (2.18) (-1.23) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.47 0.70 -0.45 0.66 -0.45 0.57  -0.40 0.66 -0.29 0.66 -0.28 0.58 
 (-3.71) (5.43) (-3.45) (5.56) (-3.62) (5.42)  (-3.91) (6.03) (-2.78) (5.73) (-2.90) (5.66) 
Intense Sell -0.79 0.49 -0.75 0.47 -0.65 0.48  -0.53 0.65 -0.48 0.63 -0.36 0.64 
 (-5.73) (4.13) (-5.72) (4.21) (-4.94) (4.81)  (-5.27) (5.18) (-4.34) (5.92) (-3.11) (6.69) 
Intense  0.32 0.21 0.30 0.19 0.20 0.09  0.13 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.08 -0.06 
Buy-Sell (2.70) (1.30) (3.39) (1.21) (3.46) (0.46)  (1.78) (0.18) (2.85) (-0.19) (2.17) (-1.39) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy -0.30 0.08 -0.23 0.11 -0.20 0.10  -0.31 0.08 -0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.11 
 (-2.08) (0.85) (-1.76) (1.18) (-1.69) (1.10)  (-2.04) (0.76) (-0.56) (1.22) (-0.28) (1.24) 
Intense Sell -0.54 0.07 -0.53 0.14 -0.35 0.14  -0.28 0.19 -0.23 0.21 -0.05 0.20 
 (-3.52) (0.70) (-3.57) (1.46) (-2.44) (1.67)  (-2.00) (1.89) (-1.86) (2.28) (-0.40) (2.47) 
Intense  0.24 0.01 0.30 -0.03 0.15 -0.04  0.03 -0.11 0.16 -0.09 0.02 -0.09 
Buy-Sell (2.75) (1.40) (1.87) (-1.15) (2.43) (-1.37)  (0.97) (-1.71) (2.07) (-1.28) (0.38) (-1.40) 
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Table 9 Regressions of Subsequent Returns of High VU Stocks 
Table reports pooled regressions of raw buy-and-hold returns of stocks that are in the top tertile of VU measure at 
the end of the quarter prior to portfolio formation. Size is the market capitalization calculated at the end of each 
quarter. Book-to-Market is calculated as book value for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30, divided 
by market capitalization of December 31 during that fiscal year. Return (-6,-3) is the cumulative 3 month return 
prior to portfolio formation and Return (-12,-3) is the cumulative 9 month return prior to portfolio formation. S&P 
500 is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm is included in the S&P 500 index. Dividend yield calculated as cash 
dividend divided by prior quarter-end share price. Lag IO is institutional ownership calculated as the ratio of the sum 
of shares held by total institutional investors at the end of last quarter to the total number of shares outstanding. 
Accrual and Asset Growth are in the previous year to the portfolio formation year. Prior FR is the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast revision over the prior 3 months to the portfolio formation quarter. Intense_Sell is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a stock experiences intense sell by institutional investors. High_sent is a dummy variable 
that takes on values zero for pessimistic and one for optimistic market sentiment. High_sent*Intense_Sell is an 
interaction between high sentiment dummy and intense sell dummy.  T-statistics are based on firm and month 
double clustered errors, as suggested by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011). T-stats that are significant for 
Intense_Sell or High_sent*Intense_Sell are in bold. 
 
 Specification (1)   Specification (2) 
 3 Months 12 Months  3 Months 12 Months 
  coefficient t -value coefficient t -value coefficient t -value coefficient t -value 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.0936 5.52 0.3202 8.92  0.0891 5.26 0.3052 8.53 
Size -0.0038 -2.25 -0.0119 -3.51  -0.0033 -1.98 -0.0104 -3.08 
Book to Market 3.1310 1.86 11.6322 5.35  2.9852 1.76 11.1544 5.2 
Stock price -0.0043 -1.39 -0.0258 -3.89  -0.0044 -1.41 -0.0260 -3.93 
Return (-6,-3) 0.0332 4.49 0.0185 1.16  0.0321 4.36 0.0149 0.94 
Return (-12,-3) -0.0123 -5.63 -0.0207 -5.69  -0.0124 -5.67 -0.0209 -5.76 
S&P 500 dummy 0.0371 5.74 0.1168 8.91  0.0368 5.72 0.1159 8.91 
Dividend yield -0.0208 -6.35 -0.0394 -6.11  -0.0209 -6.43 -0.0397 -6.28 
Lag IO -0.0070 -1.12 0.0438 3.37  -0.0095 -1.52 0.0356 2.75 
Accrual -0.0216 -1.18 -0.1628 -4.4  -0.0220 -1.21 -0.1641 -4.49 
Asset Growth -0.0078 -3.62 -0.0352 -7.45  -0.0073 -3.44 -0.0333 -7.38 
Prior FR 0.0960 1.01 0.1957 1.12  0.0961 1.01 0.1961 1.13 
Intense_Sell -0.0073 
 
-3.05 
 
-0.0271 
 
-4.96 
 
 -0.0230 -0.54 -0.0078 -0.79 
High_sent      -0.0092 -0.92 -0.0103 -0.65 
High_sent*Intense_Sell     -0.0676 -9.74 -0.2210 -16.12 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.0784 4.52 0.2989 8.03  0.0664 3.84 0.2623 7.07 
Size -0.0010 -0.61 -0.0105 -2.98  0.0000 -0.02 -0.0074 -2.13 
Book to Market 6.3308 3.45 23.1325 7.08  6.1004 3.31 22.4291 7.03 
Stock price -0.0113 -3.49 -0.0321 -4.71  -0.0111 -3.42 -0.0314 -4.63 
Return (-6,-3) 0.0274 5.02 -0.0082 -0.72  0.0259 4.75 -0.0128 -1.13 
Return (-12,-3) -0.0155 -8.77 -0.0246 -8.25  -0.0156 -8.85 -0.0250 -8.37 
S&P 500 dummy 0.0357 6.74 0.0951 8.73  0.0354 6.71 0.0944 8.7 
Dividend yield -0.0202 -6.6 -0.0277 -4.85  -0.0209 -6.88 -0.0298 -5.31 
Lag IO -0.0007 -0.1 0.0875 6.13  -0.0036 -0.52 0.0785 5.53 
Accrual -0.0058 -0.33 -0.1378 -3.95  -0.0057 -0.33 -0.1377 -3.98 
Asset Growth -0.0089 -4.31 -0.0395 -8.67  -0.0082 -4.07 -0.0374 -8.61 
Prior FR 0.0480 0.78 0.0746 0.67  0.0491 0.8 0.0779 0.70 
Intense_Sell -0.0139 
 
-3.90 
0 
-0.0267 
 
-3.61 
 
 -0.0053 -1.22 -0.0108 -1.12 
High_sent      -0.0158 -2.20 -0.0237 -1.64 
High_sent*Intense_Sell     -0.0800 -12.56 -0.2442 -19.79 
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Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -0.0221 -1.12 -0.0518 -1.31  -0.0257 -1.3 -0.0624 -1.59 
Size 0.0068 3.8 0.0128 3.67  0.0072 4.03 0.0140 4.06 
Book to Market 16.5228 4.25 77.9996 9.54  16.0823 4.21 76.6606 9.54 
Stock price -0.0103 -3.8 -0.0269 -4.95  -0.0104 -3.84 -0.0271 -5.01 
Return (-6,-3) 0.0274 3.46 0.0020 0.13  0.0256 3.25 -0.0034 -0.22 
Return (-12,-3) -0.0168 -5.67 -0.0164 -2.76  -0.0166 -5.62 -0.0159 -2.68 
S&P 500 dummy 0.0249 7.29 0.0602 8.38  0.0253 7.43 0.0616 8.61 
Dividend yield -0.0212 -9.06 -0.0340 -7.55  -0.0216 -9.27 -0.0351 -7.92 
Lag IO -0.0292 -4.35 0.0172 1.21  -0.0321 -4.8 0.0082 0.58 
Accrual 0.0340 1.63 -0.0708 -1.71  0.0309 1.5 -0.0803 -1.97 
Asset Growth -0.0197 -6.8 -0.0564 -8.37  -0.0188 -6.56 -0.0536 -8.07 
Prior FR 0.0486 0.59 0.2030 1.39  0.0464 0.57 0.1965 1.37 
Intense_Sell -0.0016 
 
-0.44 
 
-0.0081 -1.14  0.0282 0.80 0.0080 0.90 
High_sent      -0.0399 -3.22 -0.0399 -1.56 
High_sent*Intense_Sell     -0.0717 -10.83 -0.2178 -17.24 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.0868 3.66 0.1858 3.12  0.0741 3.13 0.1423 2.40 
Size -0.0030 -1.37 -0.0071 -1.39  -0.0018 -0.83 -0.0031 -0.60 
Book to Market 11.4781 3.17 61.4799 8.59  10.6281 2.97 58.5454 8.36 
Stock price -0.0078 -2.12 -0.0091 -1.11  -0.0076 -2.07 -0.0084 -1.03 
Return (-6,-3) 0.0322 4.9 0.0179 1.28  0.0303 4.61 0.0112 0.80 
Return (-12,-3) -0.0133 -6.13 -0.0234 -6.63  -0.0135 -6.22 -0.0243 -6.82 
S&P 500 dummy 0.0347 4.52 0.0711 4.27  0.0356 4.64 0.0741 4.46 
Dividend yield -0.0454 -8.55 -0.0916 -9.01  -0.0450 -8.54 -0.0905 -9.07 
Lag IO -0.0087 -1.09 0.0222 1.16  -0.0136 -1.69 0.0054 0.28 
Accrual 0.0035 0.2 -0.1772 -4.77  0.0023 0.13 -0.1814 -4.97 
Asset Growth -0.0066 -2.68 -0.0377 -7.48  -0.0060 -2.50 -0.0357 -7.43 
Prior FR 0.1451 1.58 0.1518 0.96  0.1445 1.58 0.1496 0.95 
Intense_Sell -0.0084 -2.59 -0.0174 -2.32  -0.0016 -0.33 0.0052 0.48 
High_sent      -0.0018 -0.23 -0.0177 -1.07 
High_sent*Intense_Sell  
  
      -0.0693 -9.72 -0.2390 -16.82 
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Table 10 Analyst Forecast Revisions and Institutional Trading 
This table reports the average consensus earnings forecast revision over the prior, current, and subsequent quarter to the trading portfolio formation 
quarter, conditional on market sentiment and on top and bottom tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio 
formation. Consensus analyst forecast revisions are in percentage, and statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
 Optimistic Sentiment Periods  Pessimistic Sentiment Periods 
 Prior Quarter   Current Quarter   Subsequent Quarter   Prior Quarter   Current Quarter   Subsequent Quarter  
 High 
VU 
Low 
VU 
 High 
VU 
Low 
VU 
 High 
VU 
Low 
VU 
 High 
VU 
Low 
VU 
 High 
VU 
Low 
VU 
 High 
VU 
Low 
VU 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.02 -0.03  0.07 -0.08  -0.15 -0.10  0.16 0.20  0.15 0.12  -0.01 -0.05 
 (-0.54) (-0.63)  (1.02) (-2.03)  (-2.91) (-2.39)  (3.03) (2.77)  (3.83) (2.09)  (-0.18) (-0.87) 
Intense Sell -0.04 -0.02  -0.10 -0.01  -0.46 -0.33  0.05 0.00  -0.01 0.09  -0.04 -0.12 
 (-0.74) (-0.44)  (-1.69) (-0.24)  (-3.87) (-3.95)  (0.79) (-0.03)  (-0.27) (2.07)  (-0.39) (-2.17) 
Intense  0.02 -0.01  0.17 -0.06  0.31 0.23  0.11 0.20  0.17 0.03  0.03 0.07 
Buy-Sell (0.23) (-0.19)  (2.34) (-0.92)  (2.94) (2.54)  (1.33) (2.72)  (2.78) (0.50)  (0.30) (0.92) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy 0.12 -0.07  0.01 -0.07  -0.22 -0.02  0.31 0.05  0.25 -0.02  -0.03 0.03 
 (2.00) (-1.89)  (0.15) (-2.22)  (-2.94) (-0.47)  (2.67) (0.71)  (2.86) (-0.34)  (-0.37) (0.75) 
Intense Sell -0.07 0.00  -0.16 -0.03  -0.68 -0.04  0.05 0.04  -0.04 0.05  -0.11 0.01 
 (-0.78) (-0.04)  (-2.61) (-0.53)  (-5.48) (-0.93)  (0.54) (1.23)  (-0.55) (1.23)  (-1.04) (0.20) 
Intense  0.20 -0.07  0.17 -0.04  0.46 0.03  0.26 0.01  0.29 -0.07  0.07 0.02 
Buy-Sell (1.95) (-1.17)  (2.24) (-0.94)  (3.72) (0.49)  (2.87) (0.24)  (2.74) (-1.35)  (0.69) (0.29) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.09 -0.08  0.01 -0.01  -0.41 -0.01  0.33 0.07  0.31 0.04  -0.10 0.01 
 (-1.19) (-1.31)  (0.13) (-0.26)  (-4.07) (-0.12)  (2.29) (1.30)  (2.52) (1.34)  (-0.84) (0.28) 
Intense Sell -0.16 0.05  -0.35 0.08  -0.90 -0.11  0.03 0.07  0.01 0.05  -0.29 -0.11 
 (-1.12) (1.07)  (-3.91) (2.37)  (-4.90) (-1.82)  (0.46) (1.48)  (0.16) (1.04)  (-2.18) (-1.76) 
Intense  0.06 -0.13  0.36 -0.09  0.49 0.10  0.30 0.00  0.30 -0.01  0.19 0.12 
Buy-Sell (0.47) (-1.81)  (3.74) (-1.71)  (2.90) (1.77)  (2.59) (0.03)  (2.49) (-0.10)  (2.01) (1.85) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy -0.03 -0.07  0.00 -0.03  -0.12 -0.02  0.19 0.04  0.26 0.01  -0.05 0.03 
 (-0.63) (-1.78)  (-0.09) (-0.89)  (-1.71) (-0.35)  (1.63) (0.80)  (3.37) (0.11)  (-0.54) (0.54) 
Intense Sell -0.06 -0.04  -0.15 0.01  -0.51 -0.07  0.04 -0.03  0.00 0.10  -0.25 0.00 
 (-0.64) (-0.69)  (-2.40) (0.19)  (-4.75) (-1.21)  (0.63) (-0.90)  (-0.02) (2.68)  (-2.95) (-0.01) 
Intense  0.03 -0.02  0.15 -0.04  0.40 0.05  0.15 0.08  0.26 -0.10  0.20 0.04 
Buy-Sell (0.29) (-0.39)  (2.26) (-1.07)  (3.22) (1.00)  (1.75) (1.23)  (3.06) (-2.27)  (2.69) (0.45) 
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Table 11 Return Predictability and Institutional Investor Type 
This table reports the return predictive ability of different types of institutional investors, by Bushee’s classification. At the end of each quarter, all 
eligible NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted based on their rankings of the initial-ownership-stratified changes in a certainty type of 
institutional investors’ ownership and independently sorted into tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter prior to portfolio 
formation. Within each VU tertile, time series average of the buy-and-hold DGTW-adjusted returns of the top and bottom quintiles of the type of 
institutional trading as well as the differences of top and bottom institutional trading quintiles are reported. All returns are in percentage. T-
statistics are adjusted by Newey-West serial correlation up to 4 lags. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
Panel A: Transient Institutional Investors 
  3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  High VU Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy 0.39 0.69 0.29 0.10  0.30 1.28 0.32 -0.02  -0.86 1.14 -0.39 -0.47 
 (1.13) (4.10) (1.76) (0.25)  (0.54) (3.89) (1.09) (-0.03)  (-0.81) (1.80) (-0.72) (-0.45) 
Intense Sell -1.27 -0.22 0.01 -1.28  -2.41 -0.73 -0.22 -2.20  -4.07 -0.64 -0.93 -3.14 
 (-4.63) (-0.96) (0.06) (-3.94)  (-6.73) (-1.81) (-0.50) (-4.47)  (-6.06) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-3.25) 
Intense  1.66 0.90 0.28 1.38  2.71 2.01 0.53 2.18  3.21 1.78 0.54 2.67 
Buy-Sell (4.00) (3.08) (1.06) (3.98)  (4.35) (3.44) (1.04) (4.66)  (2.85) (1.91) (0.50) (3.57) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy 0.49 0.39 0.44 0.05  0.69 0.76 0.52 0.17  -0.33 0.82 0.47 -0.80 
 (1.14) (1.91) (1.29) (0.07)  (0.87) (2.01) (0.78) (0.12)  (-0.20) (1.26) (0.36) (-0.29) 
Intense Sell -1.19 0.07 0.15 -1.34  -2.42 -0.10 -0.03 -2.39  -3.60 -0.29 -0.28 -3.32 
 (-3.11) (0.31) (0.40) (-2.01)  (-4.18) (-0.21) (-0.04) (-2.16)  (-3.44) (-0.30) (-0.19) (-1.48) 
Intense  1.68 0.32 0.29 1.39  3.11 0.86 0.55 2.56  3.27 1.12 0.75 2.52 
Buy-Sell (3.96) (1.19) (1.57) (3.43)  (3.87) (2.02) (1.73) (3.40)  (2.41) (1.34) (1.49) (2.29) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.50 0.37 2.42 -2.91  -0.88 0.04 4.88 -5.76  -3.31 -0.39 9.48 -12.79 
 (-1.80) (1.32) (6.72) (-7.13)  (-1.79) (0.10) (6.19) (-7.12)  (-3.58) (-0.51) (5.18) (-6.92) 
Intense Sell -1.08 -0.39 1.36 -2.44  -2.59 -0.61 2.67 -5.26  -4.42 -0.61 6.43 -10.85 
 (-3.48) (-1.54) (4.20) (-5.76)  (-4.95) (-1.31) (5.15) (-7.20)  (-5.27) (-0.83) (6.59) (-8.06) 
Intense  0.58 0.76 1.06 -0.48  1.71 0.65 2.21 -0.50  1.10 0.22 3.05 -1.94 
Buy-Sell (1.49) (1.99) (2.35) (-1.09)  (2.47) (0.91) (2.57) (-0.70)  (1.26) (0.18) (2.11) (-1.70) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy 0.61 0.30 0.35 0.26  1.25 0.40 0.50 0.75  1.98 1.01 0.79 1.19 
 (1.13) (1.25) (1.40) (0.37)  (1.26) (1.11) (1.15) (0.58)  (0.85) (1.33) (1.08) (0.42) 
Intense Sell -0.89 -0.01 0.16 -1.06  -2.22 0.26 0.45 -2.67  -1.90 0.66 0.65 -2.56 
 (-1.84) (-0.02) (0.59) (-1.60)  (-3.32) (0.49) (1.02) (-2.85)  (-1.65) (0.72) (0.72) (-1.39) 
Intense  1.50 0.30 0.19 1.31  3.47 0.13 0.05 3.42  3.88 0.35 0.14 3.74 
Buy-Sell (2.80) (0.89) (0.83) (2.48)  (3.76) (0.23) (0.14) (3.94)  (2.42) (0.37) (0.25) (2.76) 
 53 
 
Panel B: Quasi-Indexer Institutional Investors 
  3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid 
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy -0.31 0.11 -0.05 -0.26  -0.45 0.33 -0.22 -0.23  -1.48 -0.03 -1.30 -0.17 
 (-1.22) (0.68) (-0.31) (-0.77)  (-1.11) (1.31) (-0.76) (-0.41)  (-2.14) (-0.06) (-1.93) (-0.15) 
Intense Sell -0.35 0.33 -0.04 -0.31  -0.79 0.43 -0.22 -0.56  -1.60 0.70 -0.57 -1.03 
 (-1.55) (1.75) (-0.21) (-1.02)  (-2.10) (1.25) (-0.60) (-1.15)  (-2.13) (1.19) (-0.77) (-1.06) 
Intense  0.04 -0.22 -0.01 0.05  0.33 -0.10 0.00 0.33  0.12 -0.73 -0.73 0.85 
Buy-Sell (0.14) (-0.93) (-0.05) (0.16)  (0.61) (-0.26) (0.01) (0.59)  (0.13) (-1.14) (-1.04) (0.75) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy -0.21 -0.08 0.08 -0.30  -0.41 0.18 0.10 -0.50  -1.82 -0.06 -0.28 -1.53 
 (-0.56) (-0.45) (0.27) (-0.45)  (-0.62) (0.48) (0.16) (-0.42)  (-1.49) (-0.08) (-0.21) (-0.61) 
Intense Sell -0.39 0.25 0.36 -0.74  -0.81 0.22 0.34 -1.15  -1.52 0.35 0.41 -1.93 
 (-1.15) (1.08) (0.98) (-1.17)  (-1.38) (0.49) (0.49) (-0.98)  (-1.27) (0.41) (0.28) (-0.79) 
Intense  0.17 -0.33 -0.27 0.45  0.40 -0.04 -0.25 0.65  -0.30 -0.41 -0.69 0.39 
Buy-Sell (0.60) (-1.69) (-1.53) (1.52)  (0.70) (-0.12) (-0.85) (1.20)  (-0.33) (-0.69) (-1.58) (0.47) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy -0.36 -0.19 0.05 -0.42  -0.58 0.10 0.20 -0.78  -1.71 -0.63 -0.42 -1.29 
 (-1.05) (-0.77) (0.23) (-1.00)  (-1.17) (0.28) (0.57) (-1.24)  (-2.17) (-1.15) (-0.64) (-1.17) 
Intense Sell -0.19 0.14 -0.03 -0.16  -0.26 0.06 0.21 -0.47  -0.29 0.67 0.64 -0.93 
 (-0.56) (0.59) (-0.11) (-0.35)  (-0.48) (0.13) (0.50) (-0.66)  (-0.32) (0.75) (0.77) (-0.70) 
Intense  -0.18 -0.33 0.08 -0.25  -0.32 0.04 -0.01 -0.32  -1.42 -1.30 -1.06 -0.37 
Buy-Sell (-0.56) (-1.19) (0.25) (-0.63)  (-0.55) (0.09) (-0.01) (-0.45)  (-1.44) (-1.37) (-1.15) (-0.28) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy -0.56 -0.18 -0.19 -0.37  -0.76 -0.16 0.10 -0.85  -2.11 -0.92 -0.44 -1.67 
 (-1.33) (-0.66) (-0.79) (-0.65)  (-1.20) (-0.36) (0.20) (-0.86)  (-1.84) (-0.94) (-0.49) (-0.89) 
Intense Sell -0.53 0.32 0.04 -0.56  -0.64 0.41 -0.02 -0.62  0.34 1.30 0.50 -0.15 
 (-1.25) (1.15) (0.14) (-0.90)  (-0.92) (0.83) (-0.05) (-0.61)  (0.20) (1.62) (0.67) (-0.07) 
Intense  -0.03 -0.50 -0.22 0.19  -0.12 -0.57 0.12 -0.24  -2.45 -2.22 -0.93 -1.52 
Buy-Sell (-0.10) (-1.61) (-1.00) (0.47)  (-0.21) (-1.17) (0.30) (-0.34)  (-2.21) (-3.02) (-1.57) (-1.47) 
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Panel C: Dedicated Institutional Investors 
  3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  High VU Mid VU Low VU High-Low   High VU Mid VU Low VU High-Low   High VU Mid VU Low VU High-Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
Intense Buy 0.37 0.55 0.22 0.15  0.55 0.87 0.32 0.22  -0.35 1.65 0.26 -0.61 
 (1.33) (3.00) (1.34) (0.40)  (1.15) (2.83) (1.01) (0.34)  (-0.41) (3.22) (0.46) (-0.51) 
Intense Sell -0.90 0.03 0.23 -1.12  -1.90 0.12 0.15 -2.06  -2.85 0.16 -0.43 -2.42 
 (-3.77) (0.21) (1.39) (-3.34)  (-4.56) (0.35) (0.64) (-3.85)  (-3.71) (0.28) (-0.86) (-2.51) 
Intense  1.26 0.52 -0.01 1.27  2.45 0.75 0.17 2.28  2.50 1.50 0.69 1.81 
Buy-Sell (4.68) (2.62) (-0.04) (3.84)  (5.09) (2.01) (0.57) (4.22)  (2.98) (2.30) (1.78) (2.29) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
Intense Buy 0.43 0.33 0.11 0.31  0.44 0.76 0.25 0.19  -0.39 1.48 0.60 -0.99 
 (1.15) (1.60) (0.41) (0.51)  (0.69) (1.85) (0.47) (0.17)  (-0.30) (2.19) (0.56) (-0.44) 
Intense Sell -0.47 0.01 0.20 -0.66  -0.95 -0.18 0.17 -1.12  -1.82 -0.49 -0.08 -1.74 
 (-1.27) (0.07) (0.67) (-1.05)  (-1.48) (-0.47) (0.29) (-0.96)  (-1.39) (-0.65) (-0.07) (-0.75) 
Intense  0.89 0.32 -0.08 0.98  1.39 0.95 0.08 1.31  1.43 1.97 0.68 0.75 
Buy-Sell (4.07) (1.52) (-0.53) (3.71)  (3.97) (2.62) (0.36) (3.29)  (1.97) (3.68) (1.65) (0.91) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
Intense Buy 0.23 0.38 0.17 0.06  0.53 0.96 0.44 0.09  0.81 1.72 0.96 -0.15 
 (0.58) (1.37) (0.82) (0.12)  (0.86) (2.41) (1.17) (0.11)  (0.71) (2.19) (1.49) (-0.11) 
Intense Sell -0.41 0.01 0.53 -0.95  -0.97 -0.18 0.72 -1.68  -1.88 -0.28 0.62 -2.50 
 (-1.17) (0.06) (2.53) (-2.08)  (-1.93) (-0.52) (2.33) (-2.60)  (-2.01) (-0.49) (0.99) (-2.05) 
Intense  0.64 0.37 -0.36 1.01  1.50 1.14 -0.27 1.77  2.69 2.00 0.34 2.35 
Buy-Sell (1.74) (1.40) (-1.39) (2.14)  (2.98) (3.20) (-0.67) (2.50)  (2.91) (2.93) (0.56) (2.26) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
Intense Buy 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.01  0.54 0.48 0.34 0.20  1.37 1.03 1.35 0.02 
 (0.18) (0.28) (0.28) (0.02)  (0.75) (1.08) (0.84) (0.21)  (0.85) (1.42) (1.87) (0.01) 
Intense Sell -0.45 0.22 0.19 -0.64  -1.05 0.01 0.39 -1.44  -1.28 -0.13 0.35 -1.63 
 (-1.02) (0.83) (0.77) (-1.02)  (-1.43) (0.01) (0.95) (-1.33)  (-0.79) (-0.16) (0.45) (-0.73) 
Intense  0.54 -0.15 -0.11 0.65  1.59 0.47 -0.06 1.65  2.65 1.16 1.00 1.65 
Buy-Sell (1.60) (-0.53) (-0.53) (1.57)  (3.54) (1.27) (-0.14) (2.50)  (3.25) (2.20) (1.48) (1.58) 
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Table 12 Institutional Ownership and Market Efficiency 
For optimistic market sentiment periods only, at the end of each quarter, all eligible NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks are sorted into quintiles based 
on their rankings of the level of institutional ownership and independently sorted into tertiles by the level of VU measure at the end of the quarter 
prior to portfolio formation. Within each VU tertile, time series average of the buy-and-hold DGTW-adjusted returns of the top and bottom quintiles 
of the institutional ownership as well as the differences of top and bottom institutional ownership quintiles are reported. All returns are in percentage.  
T-statistics are adjusted by Newey-West serial correlation up to 4 lags. Returns statistically significant at 10% are in bold. 
  3 Months   6 Months   One Year 
  
High 
VU 
Mid   
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid   
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
  
High 
VU 
Mid   
VU 
Low 
VU 
High-
Low 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by 1/Firm Age 
High IO -0.54 0.31 0.04 -0.58  -1.31 0.57 -0.05 -1.27  -2.81 1.10 -0.26 -2.55 
 (-1.38) (1.08) (0.15) (-1.34)  (-2.23) (1.20) (-0.11) (-1.83)  (-2.25) (1.32) (-0.31) (-1.81) 
Low IO -0.59 0.34 -0.24 -0.35  -0.88 0.83 -0.77 -0.11  -2.22 0.47 -3.06 0.84 
 (-1.05) (0.70) (-0.50) (-0.80)  (-0.91) (0.97) (-0.85) (-0.12)  (-1.05) (0.20) (-1.44) (0.47) 
High–Low 0.06 -0.03 0.28 -0.23  -0.44 -0.26 0.72 -1.15  -0.59 0.63 2.80 -3.39 
  (0.07) (-0.05) (0.47) (-0.34)  (-0.33) (-0.25) (0.66) (-0.98)  (-0.20 (0.23) (1.22) (-1.61) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Volatility 
High IO -0.14 -0.08 0.46 -0.59  -1.07 -0.09 1.08 -2.15  -1.61 -0.22 1.23 -2.84 
 (-0.23) (-0.31) (1.61) (-0.75)  (-1.38) (-0.18) (2.44) (-1.97)  (-0.93) (-0.26) (1.15) (-1.11) 
Low IO -1.64 0.69 1.11 -2.75  -3.24 1.44 2.30 -5.54  -6.39 0.55 3.45 -9.84 
 (-2.79) (1.36) (1.40) (-2.59)  (-3.40) (1.56) (1.63) (-3.04)  (-3.70) (0.24) (0.95) (-2.38) 
High–Low 1.51 -0.77 -0.65 2.16  2.16 -1.53 -1.22 3.39  4.78 -0.77 -2.22 7.00 
 (1.87) (-1.37) (-0.99) (2.67)  (1.72) (-1.58) (-1.04) (2.49)  (1.91) (-0.34) (-0.74) (2.91) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by Analyst Dispersion 
High IO -1.56 0.02 1.95 -3.51  -3.25 -0.44 4.35 -7.60  -6.69 -1.20 9.12 -15.81 
 (-3.34) (0.05) (4.03) (-5.79)  (-4.26) (-0.76) (4.34) (-5.86)  (-6.15) (-1.25) (3.63) (-4.99) 
Low IO -1.58 -0.21 1.23 -2.81  -3.11 -0.89 3.42 -6.53  -5.14 -1.99 5.82 -10.96 
 (-2.73) (-0.44) (2.23) (-3.54)  (-3.44) (-1.25) (4.06) (-5.25)  (-2.61) (-1.39) (4.08) (-4.11) 
High–Low 0.02 0.23 0.72 -0.70  -0.14 0.44 0.93 -1.08  -1.54 0.79 3.30 -4.85 
  (0.02) (0.31) (0.98) (-0.73)  (-0.12) (0.41) (0.76) (-0.64)  (-0.62) (0.41) (1.15) (-1.04) 
Valuation Uncertainty Proxied by First Principal Component of the Eight Variables 
High IO -0.46 0.08 -0.01 -0.44  -1.15 -0.11 0.16 -1.31  -0.05 -0.35 -0.03 -0.03 
 (-0.58) (0.20) (-0.04) (-0.49)  (-0.98) (-0.16) (0.28) (-0.95)  (-0.02) (-0.31) (-0.02) (-0.01) 
Low IO -1.33 0.42 0.62 -1.95  -2.58 0.68 1.39 -3.97  -3.44 0.02 2.11 -5.55 
 (-2.15) (0.60) (0.76) (-1.57)  (-2.31) (0.59) (1.11) (-1.85)  (-1.54) (0.01) (0.88) (-1.23) 
High–Low 0.88 -0.34 -0.41 1.51  1.43 -0.80 -1.82 2.66  3.39 -0.37 -2.20 5.52 
  (1.09) (-0.42) (-0.50) (1.59)  (1.26) (-0.65) (-1.33) (1.72)  (1.35) (-0.15) (-0.97) (1.61) 
 
